Revealing Failures in the History of School Finance by Peter H. Lindert
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








For their helpful comments on earlier drafts, the author thanks Sun Go, Maarten Prak, Noam Yuchtman,
and conference participants at Queens University in Kingston, at the Instituto de Ciências Sociais in
Lisbon, at the Fundación Ramón Areces and Instituto Figuerola in Madrid, and at UC Davis.  The
usual absolving disclaimer applies. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Peter H. Lindert. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.Revealing Failures in the History of School Finance
Peter H. Lindert




This essay proposes a set of non-econometric tests using data on wage structure, school resource costs,
public expenditures, taxes, and rates of return to explain anomalies in which richer political units deliver
less education than poorer ones. 
Both the anomalies of education history, and its less surprising contrasts, fit broad patterns that can
be revealed and partially explained using low-tech methods.  Over most of human history, contrasts
in the output of education were driven mainly by contrasts in the supply of tax support for mass education.
Exogenous influences on the demand for, and the private supply of, education played only lesser roles.
Pro-growth public education could have emerged a century or two earlier than it did, had the leading
countries of Western Europe mustered the political will to fund it.  Government underinvestment in
mass education is demonstrated for England and Wales between 1717 and 1891.  Differences in political
support still account for most of today’s education anomalies where the contrasts involve less developed
regions.  
In today’s highest-income settings, however, differences in tax funding lose their previous explanatory
power.  The postwar shift away from strong effects of school resources calls for a renewed introduction
of historical context into the “does money matter” debate.
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I. WHY WASN’T, AND ISN’T, THE WHOLE WORLD DEVELOPED? 
 
  In an oft-cited presidential address, Richard Easterlin challenged economic 
historians and development economists to come up with the simplest big reason why 
most humans have been sentenced to live in poor and underdeveloped economies.  
Honoring his own question, he suggested a single big issue to pursue.  To know why the 
whole world isn’t developed, we should turn more attention to the lack of formal 
schooling, especially primary school for the masses. Before 1940, less than four percent 
of the total population was in school in most countries. Some have accelerated since then, 
and some have not.  He did not try to explain this puzzle himself, but only conjectured 
that “a major shift in political power” caused a positive shift in “the incentive structure” 
for mass education.
1 
  Education cannot be a monocausal explanation for underdevelopment, of course.  
In the quarter century since Easterlin’s address, the search for a top global force behind 
economic development has turned away from schooling toward other causal forces, 
especially institutions that secure private property rights.  Considerable progress has been 
made toward identifying historical-statistical instruments that can explain part of the 
global differences in economic growth over recent centuries.
2  The new empirical 
institutionalism does agree that the advance of knowledge is crucial to growth, and most 
empirical tests are sufficiently reduced-form to allow education policy to be part of the 
causal machinery.  Yet the featured mechanisms are the security of private property rights 
against piracy, theft, and government.  Even Gregory Clark’s challenge to the role of 
institutions ignores policies toward formal mass education, although it does introduce a 
human-capital argument about middle-class values and family size.
3  
  Still, there are several reasons for going back to school, so to speak, in the search 
for better explanations.  One is the power of history’s raw correlation: every country 
where the average income has advanced beyond, say, a thousand PPP dollars of 1990 has 
elevated its schooling, and has done so with public tax money, not waiting for private 
markets to do the educating.  It would strain credibility to argue that this is purely a 
reverse causation from economic growth to the level and funding of education. Surely, 
any shock either to the supply of schooling or to output has a cumulative effect on both.     Page  3 
 
Even the recent studies that have downplayed the role of education in comparative 
development have confirmed the significance of that role.  For example, a landmark 
article by Mark Bils and Peter Klenow emphasizing that schooling cannot explain even 
half the postwar differences in growth rates does firmly establish its minority 
contribution, perhaps as much as a third of all postwar variance in GDP growth.
4  
  A second reason to return to the role of formal schooling is that the traditional 
externalities arguments are now being confirmed by empirical tests. The externalities 
have proven significantly positive in recent econometric studies, despite the difficulties of 
measuring external effects.
5   
  How could we learn more from the human record about the causes and growth 
effects of formal education?  Given the feedbacks between education and other variables, 
there are four main kinds of evidence: 
 
  (1) randomized natural experiments, the econometric “gold standard” of causal 
identification; 
  (2) econometric estimates on panel or cross-sectional econometric samples where 
the models fail to pass tests of instrument exogeneity and power; 
  (3) non-econometric quantitative comparisons; and 
  (4) non-quantitative historical data.  
 
Each of the four kinds of evidence has a contribution to make, because of each trades 
weaknesses for strengths.  Their scientific reliability in identifying causality runs in the 
order shown here, from (1) to (4).  Yet the empirical breadth and suggestive power of 
their respective databases run in the opposite order.  At one extreme, naturalized natural 
experiments have yielded the most solid evidence on the economic and health effects of 
formal schooling, exploiting such randomizers as the calendar month of a person’s birth 
or accidents in the sequence in which different U.S. states implemented mandatory 
schooling laws.
6  The price of this high credibility is the narrowness of the counterfactual 
question answered (what if no mandatory schooling at that time, or what if the person 
were born late in the year) and the narrowness of the historical context covered.  While 
the share of history allowing randomized experiments will grow, it will always be a small    Page  4 
 
share of history.  To avoid discarding most of the human record, we must supplement the 
best narrow tests with use of shakier testing of larger ranges of experience.  This paper 
emphasizes the third technique, namely non-econometric quantitative comparisons, for 
illuminating the sources and effects of extra formal schooling.   
  It turns out that low-tech handling of a set of qualitative indicators, buttressed by 
some accounting measurements, allows us a great deal of causal insight. History has been 
kind to us: While the different historical indicators might conceivably contradict each 
other’s testimony, they often do not.  The power of those raw correlations has already 
produced strong non-econometric comparative studies of the Americas by the Engerman-
Mariscal-Sokoloff team.
7 
  The reward for using improved non-econometric evidence is the identification of 
some clear patterns in the history of education policy failures: 
  (1) Most of history makes it easy to find and demonstrate cases of 
underinvestment in primary education, with no clear cases of overinvestment.   
  (2) For at least three centuries, underinvestment in primary education has been 
mainly the result of political decision-making, not of private irrationality or of any lack of 
technology that would reward those with extra schooling.  The one clear case of private 
irrationality is many societies’ failure to educate daughters when the law allowed gender 
equity in schooling and teaching.   
  (3) Indeed, some governments have even lost net revenue by under-investing in 
mass education and failing to solve the familiar problem of capital market imperfections.  
I illustrate with two cases in which the fiscal rate of return on extra schooling exceeded 
the cost of government borrowing.  The risk-aversion argument, which may absolve 
private individuals from the charge of irrationally passing up large expected returns, does 
not apply to secure governments.   
  (4) The clearest failures have been inegalitarian, blocking education for the 
masses while investing enough public funds in elite education to bid down its returns.  In 
many cases, the inegalitarian bias shows signs of being linked to gender inequity as well. 
History has still not offered a clear case of egalitarian failure to groom top talent while 
delivering heaps of tax money to the masses.
8      Page  5 
 
  (5) Government underinvestment is likely to have occurred in several contexts 
since the late seventeenth century.  In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the secure 
states of Western Europe, particularly England, could have accelerated mass schooling 
and growth two centuries before they actually did so. This paper also casts suspicion on 
postwar governments in Latin America. 
  (6) Since the 1960s, however, the shortcomings in rich countries’ education 
policies are less clearly related to under-funding.  With nearly full enrollments in primary 
and secondary education, the frontier has shifted from education quantity to quality, and 
inefficiency is replacing insufficiency as the locus of likely policy error.   
 
II. EXPLAINING ANOMALIES IN PAST EDUCATION PERFORMANCE 
 
  Comparative historiography needs additional tools to explain the contrasts that 
have occurred over a vast, but thinly quantified, historical record.  Making the most of the 
available clues calls for a procedure that delivers clear qualitative conclusions when the 
data fail to offer a randomized natural experiment. One can find which suspects were 
responsible for historical contrasts in education outcomes, aided only by some of the 
suspects’ movements, a few clearly valid behavioral assumptions, and some additional 
contrasts, which we will call “fingerprints”.   
  To launch such a non-econometric inquiry into contrasting education outcomes, 
we must begin with what we know to be a tight inter-relationship between education 
achievement and the level of income.  Education achievement, or the contribution of 
education to productive human capital, manifests itself partly in average years of 
educational attainment and partly in some observable indicators of educational quality, 
such as test scores.  Education achievement can also take forms that do not require formal 
schooling, though they would be helped by it -- such forms as literacy and numeracy.
9  
Any dimension of this achievement (Ed) depends on incomes through these two 
simultaneous equations, for any polity i in time t: 
             (+) 
(1)  Edit = ao + a1Yit + a2Xit + eait and 
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(2)   Yit = bo + b1Edi,t−1 + b2Zit + ebit. 
 
Here Ed is any education performance outcome, Y is average income (or its logarithm), 
and X is a vector of exogenous influences on Ed -- our leading suspects, it will turn out.  
The a’s and b’s are vectors of coefficients, Z is a vector of exogenous influences on Y, 
and the e’s are error terms.  Examples of X would be the strength of economic demand 
for skills, social willingness to educate females, or government policies toward 
education; and examples of Z would be geographic or historical luck, such as natural 
resources, proximity to foreign markets, or the absence of war. The plus signs over a1 
and b1 indicate two of our frugal assumptions: outputs of the education sector depend 
positively on current average income, and income depends positively on the previous 
generation’s education outputs, Edt-1. Using the assumed linear structure of coefficients, 
the contrast between any two polities i = A and i = B, is represented by 
 
(3) ΔEdt = a1b1ΔEdt−1 + a1b2ΔZt + a2ΔXt + Δeat + aΔ1ebt for education, and 
 
(4) ΔYt = b1ΔEdt−1 +Δ b2Zt +Δ ebt  for income. 
 
To cut the differences in structure between polities, let us make the comparison 
contemporaneous, so that either polity had the chance to draw from the same global menu 
of technologies for providing education and for keeping adults alive and productive.
10 
  So far, we have little way of constraining the set of possible explanations of the 
difference between settings A and B.  To add more information, let us focus only on those 
contrasts that are education-income anomalies, defined as cases where education 
outcomes are higher in A than in B, or ΔEd > 0, even though B is richer in terms of 
income, or ΔY  < 0.  Such anomalies, with A more educated though B is richer, have 
happened in a sizeable minority of historical settings over the last three centuries.  In 
these anomalous cases, one can rule out either a poverty defense, or a Wagner’s Law 
defense, that the country with less schooling simply could not afford it.
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  For each of history’s anomalies, we now have a slightly narrower set of suspects.  
Looking back at Equation (4), let us take a case in which A was as least as educated at B 
in the previous generation too, and set the A-minus-B difference in Equation (4)’s error 
eb at zero. Then the only way that A could have been poorer than B, as the anomaly 
requires, is for the term Δb2Z to be negative.  That is, the anomaly requires that A must 
have some exogenous disadvantage (natural resources, etc.) unrelated to education.  
Turning back to Equation (3), our suspicions about how A got more education can now 
focus on the term involving education-specific suspects (a2ΔX).  It seems safe to 
conclude that this term a2ΔX plus any lagged advantage in previous education (ΔEdt−1) 
should share in explaining at least 100 percent of the contrast in education, once we add 
two reasonable assumptions: (1) the current contrast in education exceeds the income-
transmitted effect of any previous education advantage that A had enjoyed 
(ΔEdt > a1b1ΔEdt−1), and (2) the double difference in error terms (Δeat + aΔ1ebt) is not 
positive. 
   The tests still have only very limited power, however, since there can be a number 
of education-specific suspects within that a2ΔX bundle.  Worse, many of these X 
suspects cannot be measured.  A prime example would be exogenous differences in social 
attitudes affecting the private demand for schooling.   
  Fortunately, the historical record often leaves additional fingerprints in the form 
of other features left by the same education-specific suspects (the X’s).  There will be 
several observable features, Fi’s, that may be linearly related to the X’s, Z’s, and other 
forces V’s: 
 
(5) Fi = cio + ci1X + ci2Z + ci3V + eic, or, in the A-B contrast, 
 
(6) ΔFi = ci1ΔX + ci2ΔZ + ci3ΔV + Δeic 
 
The more such additional fingerprints we have, and the more we know about the signs of 
the coefficients, the more we can infer the ΔX’s and their likely roles in making the 
poorer country the more educated country.    Page  8 
 
  This simple framework leads us part of the way toward causal explanation of 
anomalous contrasts.  The framework has been a parsimonious one, involving only the 
following kinds of assumptions and information: 
 
  (a) the assumption that a greater education of the previous generation of students 
raises current national product (b1 > 0); 
  (b) the assumption that greater income raises investment in education (a1 > 0); 
  (c) the observed anomaly that A is more educated than richer country B, which 
allows us to rule out a net explanatory effect of the exogenous non-education influences 
on income (the ΔZ’s); 
  (d) data on additional fingerprints (the ΔFi’s); and 
  (e) the assumption that we know the signs of various coefficients, though we lack 
reliable estimates of their absolute magnitudes.   
 
The sharpness of our explanation will depend on the specifics of each historical 
comparison. In some cases, we will find too many X’s that could contribute uncertain 
amounts to the observed contrast, and our explanation will remain incomplete.  In other 
lucky “natural experiments”, we will be fortunate enough to find only 1-3 suspects guilty, 
yielding a fairly clear explanation of each contrast.  Better still, the clear cases will turn 
out to have some clear patterns, inviting global conjectures. 
 
III. WHERE WERE THE ANOMALIES? 
  
  History has left us enough numbers to sketch a global history of the education 
anomalies featured in this paper.  There are many cases in which a poorer country has 
higher education outputs than a richer country, even though most comparisons find that 
richer countries have more schooling.  
  The anomalies algorithm looks very symmetrical, though my paper title is not.   
In principal, each anomaly invites these choices between mirror-image interpretations: 
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• “Richer Country B ‘succeeded’ in becoming richer, despite less education, due to some 
wiser use of resources” versus “Country B failed on the education front.”  
• “Country A spent too much tax money on schooling” versus “Richer Country B spent 
too little tax money on schooling”. 
 
In each case the second interpretation seems to hold more promise.  One reason is that 
education outcomes are more policy-malleable than oil deposits and other exogenous “Z” 
influences on income, making for a more inviting research agenda.  Another is that the 
rate of return evidence suggests under-investment failures, not over-investment failures in 
the education sector.  Finally, anomalous successes in test scores (e.g. Finland and Korea 
in PISA today) seem to depend more on pedagogical efficiencies and ethnic homogeneity 
than to economic policy, offering less reward for applying economic historiography. 
  The nature of quantifiable education outputs has drifted over time.  Before the 
mid-nineteenth century the most widely available indicator was literacy. The early 
literacy history, say between the early seventeenth century and the early nineteenth, 
contained few anomalies.  Broadly, in the centuries before public schooling, those 
countries with more prosperous middle and upper classes tended to purchase more 
literacy for their children.  The best-known alleged exception is the relatively high rate of 
literacy in not-so-rich Sweden, the “impoverished sophisticate” of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.  Yet even here the anomaly was not dramatic, since Swedish 
children were highly literate but not so highly schooled. That is, they learned to read the 
Bible, but did not stay in school for many years, as revealed by nineteenth-century data.
12 
  From the middle of the nineteenth century to the late twentieth, the most useful 
indicator of education outputs was the overall enrollment rate for primary and secondary 
school.  Figures 1 through 4 follow this indicator from 1870 to 2000, with the slight twist 
that the data for 2000 have cumulated earlier enrollments into an overall educational 
attainment of the entire adult population.  Figures 5 through 7 then introduce the kind of 
education output measure that will dominate discussions of the twenty-first century:  Not 
years of schooling, which are converging over time, but achievement test scores that are 
designed to measure education quality over the primary and secondary school years.
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  Within and across the regions of the world, some anomalies have persisted since 
the mid-nineteenth century, while others have vanished or have appeared only more 
recently.  In the community defined by Northwest Europe and its overseas offshoots, the 
main past anomaly related to the performance of England and Wales.  In the nineteenth 
century, when England and Wales led in national income, it lagged behind some 
countries in enrollments.  By the late twentieth century, its position -- more precisely, that 
of the United Kingdom -- had been transformed.  As Figures 1 and 2 show for 1870-
1900, the United Kingdom as a whole sent a noticeably lower share of children through 
school than did Canada, the United States, New Zealand and Australia, even though the 
UK was the richer country in most comparisons.  In 1870, Figure 1 allows us a glimpse 
of how the international contrasts differed for the different nations within the UK.  The 
real anomaly indeed relates to the wealthier English-Welsh part of the Kingdom.  Why 
did it have lower enrollments relative to Scotland, as well as relative to North America 
and Australasia?  This case study will be pursued in Section VI below.  For now, the 
important point to note is that the English lag was indeed temporary.  By the late 
twentieth century the United Kingdom had slightly higher enrollments and adult 
educational attainments that the United States and the rest (Figure 4), and in the PISA 
achievement tests of the early twenty-first century Britain’s 15-year-olds were in the 
middle of the OECD cluster (in Figure 5), scoring higher than their U.S. counterparts.   
  A more persistent anomaly is the education underperformance of much of Latin 
America relative to East Asia and Eastern Europe. So say the available contrasts in all 
five figures, e.g. in the lower enrollments in the South American countries than in Japan 
in 1870-1930, when Japan’s income was much lower (Figures 1-3). Latin American 
schooling also lagged behind that of the Caribbean region.  That is, the anomalies tended 
to contrast poorer and better-schooled countries around the Caribbean with richer and less 
schooled South Americans.  Specifically, Costa Rica, Cuba, Jamaica, and Trinidad-
Tobago have generally been ahead in education despite their not being as rich as 
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  The most persistent historical anomaly 
contrasts better-schooled Costa Rica with underperforming Venezuela evident all the way 
from 1930 (Figure 3) through the test scores of 2006 (Figure 6).     Page  11 
 
  The Middle East also has puzzling contrasts, at least in the data available since the 
late twentieth century (Figures 4 and 5 again).  The better-educated yet poorer countries 
cluster in Anatolia and the Levant, as shown by the national observations for Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey.  By contrast, enrollments and test scores tend to be much 
lower in Tunisia and in the oil-rich countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, 
according to data from Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Oman.
14 These anomalies are 
only partly due to differences in the education of females, and call for further 
explanation. 
  Africa and Asia have their own output anomalies.  These get less attention here, 
since Africa and Asia are just beginning to participate in international testing programs 
like PISA.  Within sub-Saharan Africa, the South and East tend to be more schooled than 
the North and West, partly because the North and West still discriminate more against 
females in education.  This produces some education-income anomalies like Figure 4’s 
contrast between Malawi (poorer, more schooled in 1970) and Niger (less poor, less 
schooled).
15  Within Asia, the main anomalies are success cases, rising above the global 
draft of education with income.  In the early going, Japan achieved far more schooling 
than its income would have predicted (Figures 2 and 3).  In the postwar era, it is joined by 
Korea, which has combined long average years of schooling with test scores that match 
or exceed those of any richer Asian country (Figures 4 and 5).  And at the poorer end of 
the spectrum, China has achieved more years of average schooling than any country in 
South Asia.   
  The final illustration of revealed output anomalies draws on a present-day 
American puzzle, which a larger literature, much of it econometric, has already tackled.  
In Figure 7, as in Figures 5 and 6, the education output measure is a test-score average, 
but this time the polities are states within the United States rather than nations.  The main 
interregional pattern should be familiar to any student of U.S. education history: despite 
postwar convergence, the Southeast still has lower incomes and lower test scores than the 
Northeast and North Central regions.  The main anomaly appears in the West: California, 
Nevada, and Hawaii have peculiarly low test scores for their income levels, and New 
Mexico also tests poorly relative to lower-income Louisiana.  There is something 
distinctly worse about California’s primary-secondary schooling, even after the ethnic    Page  12 
 
mix and immigrant share have been held constant.  So one would gather from a simple 
comparison of California with middling Texas in Figure 7, and so say several 
econometric studies.
16  Thus our simple way of mapping anomalies seems to fit the 
econometric results and institutional realities of this well-documented case.  Less 
resolved, however, is the debate over the underlying causes of America’s current 
anomalies in education output, and we return to this debate later. 
 
IV. WHAT HELD BACK MASS EDUCATION? LINING UP THE SUSPECTS 
 
  To explain history’s education-and-income contrasts, let us begin by lining up the 
forces most often suspected of holding back education (the ΔX’s) as row headings on the 
left side of Table 1.  The suspects are grouped into demand-side and supply-side forces in 
the market for primary schooling.   
  The most obvious demand-side force that might have retarded education for 
millennia would be a lack of demand for the kind of labor that requires literacy, 
numeracy, and other skills that schools might help to deliver.  We naturally, though 
wrongly, suspect that most of our ancestors were unschooled largely because the 
economy had no jobs that called for schooling.  One might accuse this first suspect if one 
sought to summarize all history before, say, the Industrial Revolution as a setting in 
which the backward state of technology forced people to make their living with raw 
labor.  The first row of Table 1 says that such low demand for skills should have raised 
the relative child (unskilled) wage, lowered the adult gains from education, and lowered 
all rates of return on education.   
  In the second row stands its close relative, high demand for child labor (in the 
less-educated setting B). We often believe that children have stayed away from school 
because their parents felt they could earn good wages at an early age without going to 
class or studying. In the manufacturing zone of northern England, the Industrial 
Revolution famously kept children out of school, a problem that provoked a series of 
child labor laws and compulsory schooling laws.
17 The second row in Table 1 poses ways 
to test this possibility.  If it were the dominant constraint, and other things were equal, we 
would see higher wage rates for children, less educational attainment, and thus higher    Page  13 
 
adult-wage gains from skills (ΔW) and higher rates of return for those who invested in 
education.   
  Next come some demographic forces that must have played at least a partial role, 
leaving us the task of deciding how big a role and when.  Higher fertility would make it 
harder for parents in place B to afford schooling, even though it would not necessarily 
affect the market price of schools.  Human capital per child would be lowered.
18  Larger 
families would also supply more children to the low-skill labor market, bidding down the 
child wage and bidding up the skilled-wage premium among adults once the adult labor 
supply tilted toward less schooling.  The shift toward supplying less skilled workers 
would also raise the rates of return for those who received extra education. 
  Another demographic force probably played a major role in delaying the shift 
toward more schooling. Short adult life expectancy should have shortened the average 
work career and held down the rates of return on schooling, even though it may also have 
bid up the wage premium by supplying less skilled labor per year.  This prolonged 
restraint was removed only with the arrival of modern health improvements.  As will be 
argued below, one background reason why educational attainment is higher in Mexico or 
India today than in England or America back in the early nineteenth century, with 
roughly comparable incomes, is that Mexicans and Indians can now expect to use their 
skills over longer careers.
19    
  It is particularly natural to attribute the long delay of formal schooling to 
fundamental social attitudes, represented in Table 1 by the row “family distaste for 
schooling.” This rubric is meant to include a host of inertial instincts that parents might 
have, such as “Your grandparents didn’t need schooling to live a decent life, nor did I, 
and neither do you” or “Don’t try to move into a strange life where you’re not wanted”.  
If it were the dominant retarding force in context B, then we should expect to see a 
persistence of high skill premiums and high rates of return to extra schooling for those 
few who obtained it. 
  Discrimination is also a leading suspect, on both the demand side and the supply 
side of the market for primary schooling.  It has checked demand for schooling when 
employers or powerful competing groups deny a large share of the population its free 
access to jobs that would use the schooling.  Classic examples are refusal to hire women,    Page  14 
 
or to hire members of a disadvantaged race or caste or tribe.  Job market discrimination 
should raise the skilled wage and raise all rates of return on education for those in the 
favored group. 
  On the supply side, discrimination can also be practiced in the education 
admissions process, by restricting entry from any of the same groups of outsiders.  Either 
kind of discrimination lowers the use of persons with high ability, and drags down 
outsiders’ incentive to get that schooling.  It would show up in the data, however, in a 
deceiving way. The measured skilled wage premiums and the rates of return to education 
would all look higher, even though the true wage rates and rates of return are lower for 
those denied access.  The literature on rates of return to education has repeatedly 
reminded us of this point when discussing “screening” and the use of best-schools 
connections to allocate and restrict top jobs in government or guilds.  Where screening is 
based on ability (innate talent plus parental background), the marginal product of 
schooling looks deceivingly high because those outside the margin would be less 
productive.  Even in the less ability-biased kinds of discrimination, the returns can still 
deceive, because competition would have bid down the rates of pay being protected by 
discriminatory education.  When discrimination is a prime suspect, the historian and 
economist must decide with the help of clues not shown in Table 1.  In some cases, that is 
easy.  For example, discrimination against female education retards education and output 
in ways that are easy to quantify once one has data on education and wages by gender.   
  Alternatively, schooling may have been blocked through much of history simply 
because it had a high unit costs (or out-of-pocket costs, or “direct” costs) relative to 
average income levels.  Those high costs could have taken the form of ineffective 
teaching technology or high prices for such school inputs as teachers, books, paper, and 
safe buildings.  Such a possibility should be weighed by direct observation of high costs, 
and if possible by weighing their negative effect on the private and social returns to 
schooling.  Indirectly they should also have tended to hold up the pay premiums (ΔW) for 
those few who acquired the skills anyway.   
  Schooling will also have been lower in settings where there was less philanthropy 
to support it.  The signs of such a lack of charity are simply its low level and the same    Page  15 
 
effects that Table 1 showed for family distaste for schooling, except that denial of charity 
also lowers the private rate of return for those who do get educated.   
  The final rows in Table 1 examine the imprints of the suspect that will end up 
being featured in this essay:  The relative denial of tax support for basic education.  
Whatever its causes, it leaves a distinctive set of fingerprints.  Without tax support, the 
private returns to schooling will be lower and the restricted group receiving the schooling 
will enjoy higher pay premiums.  Society as a whole will also get lower returns.  Unlike 
other suspected causes of low schooling, the denial of tax support in one setting relative 
to another will leave its traces in relatively available fiscal data.  Table 1 points this out, 
by selecting two indicators of tax support for primary schooling, both of which tend to be 
relatively measurable even for less developed countries and for centuries past. We will 
look at these tax-support measures more closely when reviewing the evidence.   
  Looking down the rows of Table 1, one notices that two of the best-known 
suspects are missing.  First, as mentioned when we defined anomalies above, lower 
income would obviously restrain the demand for education. Yet income should not be 
listed in Table 1 because it is too central, too endogenous to any model of how education 
interacts with the economy. Income and education have tight simultaneous links, and 
progress together, as noted earlier.  One needs a lucky natural experiment to quantify the 
education effects of an income shock, or the income effects of an education shock.  While 
some econometric studies have succeeded in exploiting such natural experiments, these 
studies are few in number and their conclusions quantify what was already known 
qualitatively:  positive income shocks raise investments in education, and positive 
education shocks (e.g. mandatory schooling laws) raise income, yet the slopes of these 
relationships are not known so securely that we can simply subtract a known income 
effect to distill exogenous influences on education.  This, again, is why this study focuses 
on anomalous cases in which education was held back despite a (B) polity’s having the 
same or higher income than a polity (A) that invested more in education.   
  Second, what about the familiar problem of credit constraints?  Education is an 
expensive investment, and perhaps the central constraint in all lower-education settings 
had simply been the fact that poor parents find it harder get financing for their children’s 
education.  Credit constraints, like income, are central to any explanation of why the    Page  16 
 
whole world has had so little education, yet like income they do not belong on the list of 
exogenous suspects in Table 1.  The reason, again, is that they are too central to the 
history of backwardness, and too correlated with income.  The poorer a household or a 
whole society, the harder it is to gain the trust of lenders, for education or any other long-
term investment.  Other forces must intervene to remove these constraints.  One might 
wish that improvements in the private financial sector would have provided the keys to 
financing schooling, yet history offers relatively little hope of a low risk premium on 
private student loans for the masses.  Rather the crucial capital for mass private education 
has been provided by tax-based subsidies.  History suggests a corner solution: No country 
has achieved universal primary education without relying mainly on taxes.  Thus for 
primary education the problem of credit supply lurks in the last rows of Table 1: The 
issue is why some countries have been slower than others in supplying the tax funding 
that would solve the credit constraint for primary education.  
 
V. THREE KINDS OF FINGERPRINTS 
 
  The clues, or quantitative indicators, listed in Table 1 help us sort among the 
lined-up suspects.  In fact, they also advance our standards for judging the classic fear of 
“omitted-variable bias”.  Tests of influences, econometric or otherwise, usually draw the 
automatic agnostic response that perhaps some other omitted variables have acted as the 
true hidden causes of movements in the dependent variable.  The fingerprint testing 
introduced here serves to raise the price of agnosticism.  Anyone choosing to reserve 
doubts should explain not only what omitted variables they have in mind but also how 
these can match the extra fingerprint patterns.  The more fingerprint tests we can add, the 
fewer the number of possible suspects.   
  Three main types of fingerprints that would be left at the scene by any influence 
on comparative education outputs are presented as column headings in Table 1.   
  
A. Market Rates 
  Child wages. The opportunity cost of school children’s foregone earnings has 
dropped with economic development, a rough tendency that partly explains the long    Page  17 
 
delay in educational attainment.  We know that it dropped as nations became rich, 
because the value of hired child labor became nearly zero by law.  Once a nation passed 
laws making schooling mandatory, there was no employment opportunity during school 
hours and therefore no opportunity cost.   
  The importance of that change depends on how much children could earn in the 
more rural and impoverished settings where they were free to drop out of primary school.  
The correct answer seems to be that their opportunity costs loomed large as a share of the 
total cost of going to school.  In most of David Mitch’s calculations for Victorian 
England, the opportunity cost was four-fifths of the total cost of attending school.  In 
Lewis Solmon’s calculations for the United States in 1880 and 1890, the lost wages were 
about half the total cost of schooling in the countryside, and well above half in the 
cities.
20  Awaiting more quantitative data from other settings, we can only conclude that 
the decline of child labor opportunities was an important part of the rise of schooling.  
Still, as we shall see in rate-of-return calculations below, even with the higher estimates 
of the opportunity cost of child labor, extra schooling brought high returns to all parties, 
leaving us to explore why those returns were often passed up.   
  Direct School Costs, and the Relative Price of Teachers.  Did most of world 
history deliver so little education because schooling of given quality was more costly and 
less affordable for a typical family than it has become in today’s rich countries?  
Unencumbered by data, our intuition could run in either direction. Perhaps teachers were 
an expensive elite in less developed times and regions, and have become cheaper.  Or 
perhaps the opposite, if the quality of schooling declined and/or teachers became scarce 
with development.  We are still far from a global or even multi-national economic history 
of school costs, and equally far from a global history of teacher pay, the key input price 
in this sector.  Nor is it easy to relate relative teacher wage rates to relative unit costs 
unless or until one can hold quality constant.  
  A straightforward answer requires measurement of the average cost of a pupil’s 
week or month in school, relative to a standard income.  Such data, in a form that is 
comparable across countries or decades, are hard to find for any time before the 1980s.  It 
is hard to correct any time series on school costs or fees for the upward drift in quality 
caused by lengthening of the school year, improvements in teacher quality and pedagogy,    Page  18 
 
and class size reduction. The problem seems soluble, especially with U.S. historical data, 
but only after much careful handling.
21  Since the 1980s, the international agencies 
(OECD, UNESCO, World Bank) have made international comparisons. There are 
noteworthy differences between countries in unit costs, relative teacher pay, class size, 
and test scores. Daily school costs per child seem to rise over the course of economic 
development. The most likely reason, however, is a rise in school quality and not a rise in 
the price of a given quality of schooling. Curriculum achievement test scores are clearly 
higher in the richest countries than among test-taking students in developing countries, 
suggesting an upward drift in the quality of delivery.
22 Yet despite this rise in quality, the 
direct cost of schooling of given quality, relative to general wage rates, has no clear trend 
over the course of development. 
  A Broad Hint from the History of Wage Premiums.  Measuring the percentage 
gain in adult pay that comes with extra education can help us reach an early decision on 
the top-row suspect, namely a low market demand for skilled labor in the less-schooled 
settings.  As noted, many might suspect that there has been less schooling for centuries 
because less developed settings had less demand for skilled labor.  Perhaps these settings 
lacked skilled-intensive technology or had low tastes for skill-intensive goods before, 
say, the Industrial Revolution or the arrival of direct foreign investment from more 
advanced countries.  The lower past demand should have manifested itself in the form of 
a lower skilled-wage premium, as predicted in Table 1.  One might have gathered from 
the widening of wage gaps in North America and Britain since the 1970s that wages were 
more equal earlier, supporting the belief that demand for skills were relatively lower in 
the past.   
  Yet the growing eclectic sets of data on wage structure cast serious doubt on the 
notion that skills were less rewarded in less developed settings. Recent international 
comparisons give a clear result: Less developed settings generally have higher wage 
premiums for higher-skill occupations, and there is no trend toward higher wage 
premiums, except in countries in transition from communism.  For example, Latin 
American skilled-wage ratios remain above those of the US, especially in low-education 
Brazil, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.  The low-skill-demand argument seems to be wrong in 
predicting lower wage premiums in less developed settings.
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  The available fragmentary evidence on movements over history seems to agree 
with the recent global cross-sections.  A first hint comes simply from following American 
wage history starting from the early nineteenth century.  That history suggests wide 
swings but no clear long run widening.
24 Similarly for Britain, skill premiums showed no 
clear net movement toward widening wage gaps anytime in the last seven centuries. In 
the building sector, for example, the skill premiums dropped across the fourteenth 
century, remained stable until the mid-nineteenth, and then dropped again.
25  Jan Luiten 
van Zanden has now extended our view of wage premiums in the building sector back to 
medieval times in Western Europe, with parallel indications from some East Asian data.  
He finds that wages compressed considerably from the middle ages to early modern 
times, with no real reversal in recent centuries. 
26  Similarly, the skilled wage premium 
has declined in the building trades of India from the middle of the nineteenth century to 
the end of the twentieth.
27  While the skill premium in the building trades is not itself a 
schooling wage premium, nor a technology premium in a newly emerging sector, career 
choices would have linked the scarcities of skills across sectors. 
  Though the wage premium evidence is indirect, apparently earlier and less 
developed settings gave relatively high rewards to the kinds of skills that schooling 
helped to develop.  The same was probably true in the commercial sphere, where literacy 
and counting have always been valued.  We should look to other suspects, instead of 
positing that there was less demand for literacy or numeracy in earlier settings. 
 
B. Rates of Return, with Caveats and Global Patterns 
  Let us turn next to a direct examination of rates of return on education, both as 
concepts and as empirical measures produced by a scholarly cottage industry in the late 
twentieth century. The rates of return have typically been used as clues about 
underinvestment or overinvestment in formal education.  Somebody (private and/or 
public entities) has under-invested in the sense of lowering GDP if the rate of return is 
too high, and over-invested if they have driven the rate of return to levels that are too 
low.  The vast literature measuring postwar rates has revealed important patterns that 
probably held throughout modern history.  Before viewing these patterns, however, we 
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  Caveats about Conventional Private and Social Rates.  We start with the 
conventional private and social rates of return, before introducing this paper’s new 
emphasis on the fiscal rate of return.  The present value of private benefits is the 
discounted sum of the extra after-tax income gains from the extra education.  
Correspondingly, on the cost side, the household incurs out-of-pocket private costs plus 
the opportunity cost of what the child would have earned in not in school.  The internal 
rate of private return is the rate of discount, rP, that equates the present values of benefits 
and costs.   
  The familiar “social” benefits and costs of giving an individual more schooling 
are discounted in a similar manner, except that the affected party consists of the 
household and philanthropic and government sectors together. Again, the internal rate of 
return is that value of the rate of discount that makes net present value equal to zero.  
Externalities are ignored here, as they are in all past measurements of the “social” rate of 
return.  I shall also set aside non-economic consumption benefits of education, to instill a 
bias toward understating some conclusions to be drawn later.
28  
  The rate of return estimates must be used with a great deal of caution. The first 
problem is that the rates are based on a different counterfactual, a different “margin”, 
than what most users of the measures would want.  We typically want the rate of return 
measure to compare the gains and losses from somehow encouraging a marginal child to 
complete the next step of education.  Yet the measure itself does not do that.  Rather it 
gives us what might be called the “average marginal” rate of return on the difference in 
education at two levels, such as high school graduates versus primary school finishers.  
The implicit counterfactual is unintended and unattractive: What if we had somehow 
blocked everybody from getting the high school diploma?  Furthermore, as a particular 
level of education becomes more universally attained, e.g. with almost everybody 
finishing primary school, the difference in the earnings of the two groups reflects the 
increasingly atypically nature of those who don’t even finish primary school.  There is no 
way to avoid the fact that the marginal returns and costs may not equal the average ones 
already attained, and we must imagine just how fast the diminishing returns to education 
might set in as it expands.  Such judgments must be reached on a case-by-case basis.     Page  21 
 
  A second problem is that rates of return are typically over-estimated by making 
the nearly universal assumption that people go to work and capture the extra earnings that 
their education makes possible.  Yet adults, especially females, typically work less than 
that level at which they would fully reap the rewards of their educational attainment.  At 
the level of the individual, this point matters little, since one can simply assume that 
every individual was free to choose between paid work and home time, so that education 
has raised the marginal value of their time whether or not they work for pay.  However, if 
we are interested in effects on the growth of GDP per capita, or in the effects of education 
on government revenue, the incompleteness of labor force participation means that the 
economic returns are overstated.  In what follows this likely effect of incomplete work 
will be taken into account.  
  Two Useful Global Patterns, Despite Another Flaw. Despite these caveats, there 
is a great deal of useful information in comparing rates of return across contexts.  Recent 
studies have produced the useful rates of private and social return shown in Table 2.
29  
Note that Table 2 has three patterns. First, the rates of return are usually higher in poorer 
countries, as one might expect from the greater severity of credit constraints in poor 
settings. This suggests what the emerging economic history of wage structure has also 
suggested:  The economic gains from education were probably even higher in that past 
than they are today.  Second, the rate of return is usually higher at the earlier levels of 
education.  The return on primary education exceeds the return on higher education, even 
without measuring externalities, which should have been larger in primary schooling.
30  
Finally, the private rates of return look higher than the social rates because of a 
questionable decision that the authors have consistently made in defining the private rate.  
  The first two tendencies offer valuable historical clues that probably extend back 
for centuries, but the third is misleading. How could the private rate always exceed the 
social rate, as shown in Table 2?  The key assumption relates to the role of government in 
the private rate calculations.  Like most authors calculating private rates of return, George 
Psacharopoulos and co-authors have deducted government subsidies to education from 
the private cost side, but ignored the taxes paid on the private benefits side.  Their 
decision to take a short cut was made explicit at least as early as 1981: “Of course 
earnings [in the social-rate calculation] should be before tax, whereas in the private rate    Page  22 
 
of return calculation earnings should be after tax.  But contrary to popular belief, the 
post- versus pre-tax treatment of earnings does not make a big difference in the rate of 
return calculation.”
31  The same short cut has been taken by most of the rate of return 
literature, though the difference was quantified in an early study by W. Lee Hansen and 
also discussed by Gary Becker.
32 Some authors have omitted all taxes from the 
calculation of private returns, while others only missed indirect taxes, some kinds of 
wealth tax, and the losses of social program benefits that accompany extra earnings.  
Early authors (e.g. Hansen, Becker) were in this less-biased category, rightly introducing 
income tax rates but missing other taxes altogether. 
  The whole international comparative literature, however, took a step backwards 
after 1964 by failing to deduct any taxes at all from private returns. Only in 2005 did the 
OECD re-introduce income taxation and explicitly consider the fiscal rate of return, 
though they still failed to deduct indirect taxes from the extra earnings.
33  
  Overstating the private returns by the amount of direct and indirect taxes paid on 
extra income misdirects our suspicions.  Viewing the persistent gap in private versus 
social rates of return, one might ask “Why do private individuals constantly under-invest 
more in education than does society as a whole?”  That puzzle would be lessened, 
however, if the calculations took account of direct and indirect taxes, thus lowering the 
private rates of return.  The numbers need to be worked out, since governments take their 
bite from every year of a long work career.  (The social rates, however, are free from this 
tax bias.) 
  The Fiscal Rate of Return.  Correctly handling taxes invites a calculation of the 
fiscal rate of return on extra education attainment and quality.  Such a calculation can 
reveal whether governments have actually passed up large bills on the sidewalk, i.e. large 
later tax revenues, by refusing to pay smaller amounts to subsidize mass schooling.  The 
fiscal rate of return is the internal rate that equates the revenue gains and the costs that 
extra education brings to government itself.
34 
   In what follows, we will find two historical cases in which the fiscal rate of 
return on education was quite high, like many of those private and social rates of return.  
Yet the fiscal measure has some extra strength as a clue revealing past underinvestment 
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argument is much less applicable on the government side.  Traditionally, we look at the 
high rates of return foregone on private investments and excuse them on the grounds that 
such investments are very risky, warranting a rate well above the interest rates at which 
risk-averse private businesses and households might borrow.  The traditional argument is 
certainly valid for private education loans, which repay private lenders only over a whole 
generation.  Yet for a provincial or national government, it seems unlikely that the 
aggregate future tax returns from investing with subsidies in mass education are so 
uncertain. Indeed, the uncertainty of the aggregate tax base could even be reduced by 
subsidizing broad-based education. Calculations for Victorian England and postwar 
Venezuela will confirm that the governments could have earned higher rates of return 
than the interest rates they paid on their own debt.   
  
C. The Relative-Public-Inputs Evidence 
  Next let us turn to Table 1’s pair of tax-support clues that allow us a direct view 
of political and fiscal efforts in support of education.  The first clue is a support ratio 
defined as
35  




This ratio scales the generosity of the subsidy in terms of the population’s ability to pay.  
Such a measure is already displayed in publications by the OECD and UNESCO, as well 
as in the scholarly literature.
36 What is the norm for this ratio? If it is lower in setting B 
than in higher-education A, is that a bad thing for B?  The answer will depend on whether 
or not A has over-invested in subsidizing and delivering primary education.  The 
empirical literature tends to approve of the levels of primary-education support in today’s 
most-educated societies.  Granted, there is a hot debate over whether adding more money 
would do any good in the public schools of the United States and other OECD countries, 
with Eric Hanushek supplying an abundance of evidence for the null hypothesis, and 
there is good reason to wonder whether the subsidies need to be restricted to publicly-
supplied schooling.
37  Yet nobody in these debates has mustered evidence in favor of 
actually cutting primary school subsidies or in favor of cutting attendance toward the 
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to presume that the more educated setting A has not yet reached the point of over-
investing in primary education, especially since those rates of return continue to run so 
high (again see Table 2).  
  A quick examination of Table 3’s postwar rates of public support for primary 
schooling helps to bring this simple public-expenditure fingerprint into focus. Globally, 
those countries whose children went to school less and got lower test scores (as in 
Figures 4-6) tended to be countries that were less willing to spend taxes even in relation 
to their average incomes (here in Table 3).  Some of them were poorer, of course, 
allowing them the excuse that they simply could not afford to spend as high a share of 
their income on public education.  Yet this Wagner’s Law variant on the poverty defense 
falls short in the cases in which richer countries chose to spend less on public schooling.  
We will find that most of history’s anomalies were such cases, with richer countries 
achieving less education largely because they spent less of their incomes on taxes for 
schools. 
  The second selected support measure also reveals much about education finance 
in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  It is a double ratio, by level of education: 




where tertiary refers to university education and other training beyond secondary school.  
The lower this ratio in setting B relative to setting A, the more favor given by B’s 
governments to higher education.   
  Again, the ratio cannot be used to judge education policies until we have a norm, 
a “best” balance between subsidizing primary education and subsidizing tertiary.  One 
guide is that the case for externalities from education spending has been stronger for 
primary than for higher education.  It was primary education that Adam Smith, Thomas 
Jefferson, and Milton Friedman considered most worthy of subsidy on the ground that 
mass schooling created citizens and social order, and the econometric evidence cited 
above also emphasized spillovers from primary and secondary education.  Granted, 
institutions of higher learning in the United States and a few other advanced countries 
generated great spillover benefits from their Research and Development.  Yet the returns 
from the instructional part of higher education are arguably more private.
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  By itself, the fact that externalities might be greater for lower levels of education 
does not tell us the “best” balance of public subsidies.  Yet if we accept the notion that 
the per-student externalities could reasonably be larger at the primary level, then the 
“best” value of the primary/tertiary ratio should not be below one in any country.  
Alternatively, in the OECD countries this ratio tends to be one-half (50%), as shown at 
the top of Table 4.  To err on the side of acquitting too many governments of developing 
countries, let us say that the efficiency norm is 50 percent.   
  Table 4 reveals that many developing countries spend less than half as much tax 
money on each primary student as on each student in higher education, causing us to 
wonder how the case for subsidizing those at the top could be stronger in countries with 
more illiterates and less research-agglomeration efficiencies of the sort experienced in the 
world’s top research centers.  Recent literature has supported these suspicions by finding 
that inequality in educational attainment, a result fostered by favoring higher education 
subsidies, has had a negative effect on economic growth since 1960.
39  Note that this 
primary-versus-tertiary fingerprint offers telling evidence even without an education 
output anomaly. Countries with relative primary support ratios well below 50 percent in 
Table 4 cannot use their poverty as an excuse, since the same education budget could 
have been more productively reallocated from tertiary to primary education.  Such cases 
suggest a policy failure regardless of the nation’s income per capita.
40  Table 4 hints that 
a counterproductive bias in favor of over-subsidizing higher education, and under-
subsidizing primary education, is endemic in Latin American, the Caribbean, Africa, 
South Asia, and Southeast Asia.  We return to this point in discussing postwar Latin 
America.    
 
VI. THREE FINGERPRINTING APPLICATIONS 
 
A. England and Wales 1717 - 1891   
 
  A strong illustration of the applicability of this paper’s clues in earlier history is 
provided by English experience between the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Fees 
Act that finally funded universal primary education in 1891.  Here is a case that 
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Table 1. By 1688, England was a great power with a secure government and a famously 
secure revenue base.
41  Yet England and the United Kingdom delivered relatively little 
tax support for primary schools.  Both England-Wales and the Kingdom as a whole 
lagged behind France and the United States (along with Prussia) until the Fees Act of 
1891, despite having a higher income per capita.  So testify both the primary-school 
support ratios (public or total expenditures per pupil, divided by GDP per capita), and 
also the teacher/pupil ratios.
42  Elsewhere I have conjectured that centralization and 
restriction of the franchise played important roles in holding Britain behind until the 
franchise was extended down the social ranks and the demand for schooling became 
overpowering.
43   
  Confirming evidence comes through the availability of micro-studies of education 
in Victorian England, studies that now make it possible to quantify the returns on 
primary-school investments in England.  David Mitch’s work allows us to convert his 
extensive data on occupational rewards and school costs into rates of return on three 
years’ schooling in the 1820s leading to literacy in adulthood, and Jason Long’s matching 
of children in the 1851 census with adults in 1881 provides a similar view of the returns 
to completing primary school around mid-century. Table 5 presents estimates of the 
returns that are conservative in that they are likely to understate some of the gains or 
overestimate some of the costs.
44  Even with this tilt toward underestimation, the returns 
are high enough to make some suggestions.  The private and social returns are up close to 
those reported for the 1970s-1990s in Table 2 above, even though the Victorian English 
population had noticeably shorter careers.  One implication of this is that the direct costs 
and opportunity costs of schooling did not loom large enough to choke off the case for 
investing in formal primary education.  Yes, there was sufficient demand for literacy, 
despite the likelihood that the demand for child labor held back the progress of schooling 
in the industrial North for a few decades.  
  The main innovation in Table 5, however, is the fiscal rate of return.  Even with 
estimates that are probably too pessimistic, it was well above the rate of interest at which 
Parliament could borrow.  The issue returns:  Why did Parliament decline to subsidize 
mass schooling if it would repay Her Majesty’s government itself? Indeed, the fiscal 
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participation would have been only partial, especially for females.  Table 5’s Row (h.) 
reports the same rates of return as for 1840, but with the adult earnings increments cut in 
half.  This lowers the rates of economic return on schooling, though not by half the rate 
itself.  The result is still a double-digit rate of return -- either private or social or fiscal -- 
well above the 4.4 percent rate at which Her Majesty’s government could have borrowed.  
The government appears to have left money on the sidewalk by not investing more in 
primary education before the Elementary Education Act of 1870 and the more decisive 
Fees Act of 1891. 
  The failure may have extended back to the start of the Hanoverian dynasty.  As 
far as we know, the returns and costs of primary education in the eighteenth century 
should have yielded rates of return at least as high as those in Table 5, given what we 
know about tax rates, interest rates, and the wage structure.  The tax rates paid by 
laborers were thought by Joseph Massie to be 8 percent, similar to the Victorian rates.
45 
Government could also borrow cheaply: The consol rate was below five percent as early 
as 1717, the fourth Hanoverian year.  So as early as 1717, the government could have 
reaped a significant fiscal return by investing in universal primary education.  Finally, the 
wage structure did not reward education any less in the eighteenth century than later, 
given the indirect evidence cited when introducing the skilled/unskilled wage ratio in 
Table 1 above.  Thus given the history of tax rates, interest rates, and wage rates, the rates 
of return back to about 1717 should have been as high as those Victorian rates shown in 
Table 5.  It is fair to ask why Parliament in 1717 could not have enacted something like 
the Education Act of 1870, followed 21 years later, in 1738, by an analogue to the Fees 
Act of 1891.  The usual explanation just re-poses the same question:  Yes, education 
subsidies were blocked partly by conflicts over the link between education and religion, 
but these were later resolved in favor of free public schooling.  Regardless of what 
explains the opposition to tax-based schooling, the point remains that the operative 
constraint that held up the advance of schooling lay in the collective unwillingness to 
supply taxes. 
  We cannot extend the same simple indictment back before the late seventeenth 
century, however.  The consol rate was well above five percent under the Stuarts and the 
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1688.
46   Britain and other emerging states were still not secure enough to take a more 
modern long-run view of the economics of education subsidies.  And before the late 
fifteenth century, regimes were not only insecure but also more rural than the Tory 
opponents of education in the nineteenth century, and thus had a self-interest that 
opposed paying taxes to educate peasants to flee or revolt.  Yet from the early eighteenth 
century on, the necessary elements were all in place -- other than political will.   
  Thus for the Victorian period at least, and probably for the whole period from 
1717 to 1891, England-Wales and the United Kingdom underperformed in the sphere of 
education relative to the United States and France.  The culprits can be summarized using 
the line-up of suspects in Table 1.  Drawing on data for the Anglo-American anomaly of 
1850-1890, the guiltiest suspect appears to have been deficient British (or superior 
American) political will to pay taxes for primary schools, to judge from those support 
ratios and from Britain’s lower teacher/pupil ratios.  Accomplices may have included a 
high relative wage for child labor in Britain and the higher cost of Britain’s (more male) 
teachers relative to the (more female) primary-school teachers of North America and 
Australasia.
47  Other suspects are acquitted:  Relative to the United States, rich Victorian 
Britain did not suffer from lower market demand for skills, or higher fertility, or shorter 
adult life expectancy, or weaker philanthropy.   
 
B. Latin America in the Twentieth Century 
  The lag in Latin American schooling behind that of North America has been 
summarized and tentatively explained in a series of writings by the research team of 
Stanley Engerman, Elisa Mariscal, and Kenneth Sokoloff (EMS).  Reaching back to the 
colonial era for root causes, they argue that low and unequal education, like other 
symptoms of Latin American inequality in the nineteenth century and early twentieth, 
stemmed from inequality in political power and landownership.   They conclude that 
 
“although investment in schooling is strongly and positively correlated with per 
capita income over time and across countries, much variation remains to be 
explained.  Moreover, the extent of inequality in political power, as reflected in the    Page  29 
 
proportion of the population who can vote, does seem to be associated with lower 
literacy and schooling rates.”
48 
 
To this Ewout Frankema has now added an important extension of the data on Latin 
American education since 1870, emphasizing the inequality of education more than its 
average level.
49   
  This section follows their lead, both in focusing on anomalous departures from 
the income-education correlation and in emphasizing the distribution of political voice. 
I offer new twists in the geography and historical timing of the Latin lags, especially for 
the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, and fresh evidence on the political 
economy of government failure to subsidize.  My tentative conclusions, to be presented 
elsewhere, are: 
 
  (1) If one compares Latin America with the rich industrialized countries, as the 
EMS team has done, the data neatly fit both their concern and their explanation.  Relative 
to the richer countries, Latin American education has always been low and unequal. 
  (2) While I think their explanation is the correct one, we must acknowledge that 
their North-South contrast fits too many hypotheses.  In the language of this paper, the 
fact that Latin America has always been poorer allows critics to resist our hunch that 
unequal voice is the key.  Their lower education attainments do not pose an anomaly. 
  (3) The search for anomalies yields more fruit, by revealing cases in which a 
Latin American country has less education, and more unequal education, than poorer 
countries.  There are several such Latin American anomalies. The most dramatic one is a 
case that has been relatively ignored: Venezuela.
50  This section focuses on that case and 
finds strong support for indicting a political environment that refused to subsidize mass 
schooling.   
 
  The global positioning of Latin American education achievements can be judged 
by a renewed look at Figures 2-6 above. The region as a whole indeed had far lower 
education than Canada, the United States, or Northwest Europe between 1900 and 2006.  
Relative to countries with similar income per capita, its lag was less dramatic, as the    Page  30 
 
figures suggest.
51  Latin America’s disadvantage might be reinforced a bit if one could 
adjust the enrollments data for a bias now identified by Frankema. Not only are Latin 
American enrollments a bit lower, for a given income per capita, but these enrollment 
rates also consist of a higher share of grade-repeaters dropouts, and a lower share of true 
primary-school completers, than on other continents. He thus finds that the postwar 
catching-up in Latin American enrollments may hide a loss in educational quality, 
relative to other continents.
52  
  If Figures 2-6 show that Latin America as a whole has not distinctly lagged all 
other continents in education attainment, they nonetheless also show some incriminating 
anomalies.  The new clues cast a different light on the Southern cone countries.  The 
Engerman-Mariscal-Sokoloff team described Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay as education 
leaders in the Latin American context.  While that is broadly correct, these three countries 
provided less schooling than several poorer countries outside South America.  As of 
1900-1930, enrollment rates in Argentina and Uruguay trailed behind those of both the 
mother countries (Spain and Italy), and trailed behind those of much poorer Japan, 
Greece, and (in 1930) Romania.  In terms of test scores, Argentina’s first entry into the 
PISA exams, in 2006, yielded lower sample-average scores than those achieved by 15-
year-old students in Turkey and Mexico.  Thus the position of the Southern Cone 
countries in education history depends on what other countries we compare them to.  On 
the global level, they have tended to be slight under-achievers relative to countries in 
other regions with the same incomes.   
  The most noteworthy anomaly, however, relates to Venezuela, a country whose 
education history has been seriously under-studied (at least, in the English-language 
literature).  Throughout the twentieth century Venezuela has been a clear Country-B 
“failure” case, a rich country with strangely low education.  Despite its oil prosperity 
after World War I, Venezuela’s school enrollment rates in 1930 were no higher than 
those of much poorer Turkey, and also below those of Mediterranean Europe, as well as 
such distant poor countries as Japan, Romania, and even Siam (Figure 3).  Closer to 
home, Venezuelan children have been consistently less schooled than those in at least 
five poorer neighbors: Colombia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Trinidad-Tobago, and Mexico.
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Even as late as 2006, after decades of oil wealth and after a few years of enrollment    Page  31 
 
increases under Hugo Chavez, Venezuela’s sixth-graders got the second-lowest national 
average sample score in math and reading out of 16 countries (Figure 6).  
  Why these anomalies? Why did some many Latin American countries each enroll 
and teach a lower share of their children than poorer countries?  Some initial suggestions 
can be offered here, ones that will be expanded in later writings. 
  For all of Latin America, as for Industrial-Revolution Britain, we can reject some 
natural suspicions.  It seems untrue that the relative demand for higher-skilled and higher-
educated labor was weaker in Latin America.  On the contrary, skill premia seemed as 
high there as on any other continent.
54  Nor was the use of child labor any greater in Latin 
America than in South Asia or Africa or the Middle East.  There has also little 
discrimination against female enrollments for at least a century of Latin American history 
-- certainly not as much as in Mediterranean Europe, the Middle East, Africa, or South 
Asia.
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  For Latin America as a whole, as for Industrial Revolution Britain, the main 
culprit has been a political bias against subsidizing mass schooling.  To the evidence 
already presented by EMS and by Frankema, this section can add two new international 
clues, one for the start of the twentieth century and another for the later twentieth and the 
early twenty-first.  The start-of-century clue appears in the form of a pair of diagrams, 
Figures 8 and 9, comparing expenditures across countries around the year 1900.  Back 
then, says Figure 8, Latin America spent about as much per child of school age as other 
regions at the same income levels.  The behavior of the data-supplying countries clusters 
along the same familiar line relating expenditures to income.  In this respect, there was 
nothing different about Latin American school finance, given the levels of income.  
Figure 9, however, reveals a consistent difference using some of the same data.  It 
decomposes Figure 8’s expenditures per child of school age into (expenditures per pupil) 
times (pupils per child of school age, alias the enrollment rate).  The two components are 
graphed against each other, separately for Latin American and the rest of the world.  One 
would expect the two to rise together as we move from poorer to richer countries, and 
they do so in Figure 9.  Yet the relationship between these two components is different 
for Latin America:  Moving toward the richer and higher-spending countries like 
Argentina yields much less gain in enrollments per dollar of expenditure per enrolled    Page  32 
 
pupil, than the same movement (toward the US and New Zealand behavior) in the rest of 
the world.  Given the same resources, Latin American governments somehow delivered 
more inputs per pupil to a smaller fraction of the school-age population.  This appears to 
be the same sort of elitism in deciding what schooling to supply, and in what 
neighborhoods, as was emphasized by EMS and by Frankema.   
  A century later the same elitism seems evident in much of Latin America, even 
though the locus of power has shifted.  A key choice variable in today’s education 
structures is the allocation of public funds between using the same tax money for higher 
education or using it for primary (and secondary) education.  We saw in Table 4 above 
that countries differ greatly in their choices here.  Among the data-supplying countries of 
Latin America, Table 4 suggests that primary education seems to have been short-
changed relative to higher education in Argentina before the return of democracy, in 
Brazil, in Chile before the concertación began in 1990, and in Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela (but not in Cuba).  Given that the social rates of return 
run higher for the earlier stages of education in these same countries, their tilt toward 
higher education appears to have lowered GDP.  This testimony from Table 4 agrees with 
several past studies about Latin America as well as about the Asian and African countries 
with low relative investments in primary education.
56   
  Since Venezuela’s low education performance offered the most glaring anomalies 
in Figures 2-6, its sources need to be identified.  Here, even more than in other countries, 
the culprit seems to have been a political bias against mass education.  That bias was 
spotlighted back in 1959, when Carl Shoup and his collaborators published their task-
force study of the whole fiscal structure of Venezuela: 
 
“Education has such a low priority in the national investment program that the 
level of education relative to income is one of the lowest in the world.  Further 
progress in the non-petroleum sectors, particularly industry, agriculture, and 
government, will depend heavily on better education.”
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So they judged at twentieth-century Venezuela’s first sustained switch from caudillo rule 
to democracy.  Yet, as we saw in Tables 3 and 4 and in Figures 5 and 6, Venezuela still 
has not caught up, despite three rounds of sudden enrichment from oil price hikes.   
  So large were the windfalls passed up by Venezuela’s politicians that they may 
even, like Victorian Britain, have missed a high rate of return to government itself.  That 
is, the fiscal rate of return may have exceeded the opportunity cost of funds.  The 
Venezuelan data in Table 6 suggest that the under-investment may have reached even this 
extreme, to judge from data circa 1958.  The cost of public funds for investments like 
education was thought to be about 10 percent.  On the assumption that people worked full 
time after their education, not only the rest of society but also the government itself could 
have reaped a net gain from extra investment in any level of education (far right column).  
On the pessimistic assumption that people worked only half time, the same would not be 
true, so that the lost social gains did not translate into losses for government itself.   
  Such evidence of bias does not emerge in all cases. As Table 6 shows, the same 
was not true of Mexico around 1963, suggesting that Mexico’s bias against subsidizing 
primary education was less strong.  Still, the fiscal rates of return in Table 6 were not 
negative, which underlines a more basic point:  Investing in education did raise revenues 
for government, contrary to the assumption commonly implied.  An open question is why 
they did not discuss such returns.  If they had somehow not thought of the point, why 
not?   
 
C. Different Fingerprints in Today’s Rich Countries 
  The third illustrative application reveals a developmental shift in the seeming ability 
of different forces to explain differences in education outputs.  For historical settings before 
the late twentieth century, and continuing into the twenty-first for developing regions, it has 
been easy to identify insufficient tax support as a prime culprit in poor performances.  A key 
premise of this explanation is, of course, that spending more tax money would keep children 
in school longer and raise their test scores.  This premise is well supported for most history 
and for most of the world’s children today.  As we have seen in Figures 8 and 9, enrollments 
historically responded to raising tax support per pupil or per child of school age.  We also 
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income countries, again pointing to insufficient supply of public funds as the main check on 
education.  For most of modern history, there should have been little doubt that “money 
matters”, both in raising the years of schooling and in raising cognition.   
  In today’s rich countries, however, the money-matters premise is less strong, possibly 
because we have changed frontiers for primary and secondary education.  Once a country has 
reached full enrollments and high attendance up through age 15, and the average child 
reaches 8,000 hours of instruction between the 5th and 15th birthdays, adding further tax 
support can only raise test scores, productivity, and income by improving the quality of 
learning per hour of contact time.  How money translates into quality learning is less 
obvious.   
  Figures 10 and 11 offer crude hints about this developmental shift, by graphing recent 
test scores against expenditures per primary school pupil.  Figure 10 notes two different 
slopes in the international OECD data for 2004-2006.  If we include the new test-taking 
countries Turkey, Chile, and Mexico in the sample, there is still an upward slope:  more 
public expenditures seem to be accompanied by higher test scores.  If the PISA tests were 
given to 15-year-olds world-wide, then most of the test-taking students would yield national 
averages like those of Turkey, Chile, and Mexico, or further to the southwest in Figure 10, 
and there would be a even more significant positive slope relating public expenditures to test 
scores.  Yet among the rich OECD core countries (white circles) and formerly communist 
countries of Eastern Europe (black triangles), the slope between expenditures and 
achievement scores is nearly flat.  Countries spending much more failed to raise their student 
test scores significantly.  Figure 11 finds the same twist among states of the United States.  
Over all 50 states, there appears to be a significant upslope relating public school 
expenditures and the NAEP test performance of eighth-graders.  Yet the 50-state picture 
includes several poorer states of the South and West that have not completed the 
developmental shift.  True, their children stay in school past age 15, and their schools run the 
same 175-180 days per year as in the rest of the country.  Yet their lower spending seems to 
have lowered quality by raising class sizes in the Western states, and in unmeasured ways in 
the South.  Yet when we restrict our view to the more prosperous and established Northeast 
and North Central regions, the effect of expenditures drops to insignificance, as indicated by 
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expenditures per student is already high, one gets the kind of result that Eric Hanushek 
repeats so often: no clearly significant effect of spending more.   
  Once a region’s income and educational effort is up in the range where extra 
expenditures have less certain effect, it should not surprise us to find more abundant clues 
that something other than expenditures is responsible for those anomalous cases in which 
rich areas have poorer education performance.  And so it seems for two anomalous under-
performers in the United States.  One is the District of Columbia, where test scores were too 
low to fit conveniently on Figure 11.  Even though the District has a technically high average 
income, its income inequality is extreme and its school system is stricken with controversy 
and fighting. Expenditure levels are not the prime suspect.   
  The other poor performer to be noted here is California, which shares with New 
Mexico and Hawaii the unenviable position of having low student test scores despite having 
an average income level. Why are California’s test scores worse than those of Texas and 
North Carolina, with their similar expenditures and similar percentages of ethnic minorities, 
by about 1.5 standard deviations among state averages?  The relatively lower test scores can 
be only partly due to low expenditures.  Despite frequent rumors to the effect that California 
ranks 49th in education spending per pupil, or in education spending as a share of state 
income, its expenditures are only moderately low by inter-state standards.  In the 2004-2005 
school year, California’s current expenditures per enrolled student were 91 percent of the 
national average.  The performance looks a bit anomalous for a state with a slightly higher-
than-average income, yet California’s rank among states was still no worse than 30th.   
  The input measure that does put California near the bottom of states is not 
expenditures, but teachers per pupil, the inverse of class size. California ranks 48th, above 
only Arizona and Utah.   
  If California pays for fewer teachers for each (say) 100 students than any other state 
but Arizona and Utah, why were its expenditures not so far below average? California has 
apparently always ranked near the top in average annual pay for a state’s teachers.  That may 
have been true as far back as 1880. With greater certainty, we know that California ranked 
2nd-7th among states in average teacher pay since 1939 or earlier, and ranks 3rd by this 
measure today.
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  To pin down causes, it also helps to know when California’s relative performance 
sagged, and which suspects would have contributed to this sagging.  The anomaly is 
relatively recent.  For relative expenditures per pupil, we know that California’s 
expenditures per pupil ranked as high as 7th back in 1960. Its spending per pupil has been 
below average only since sometime in the 1980s, reaching a trough at 87 percent of the 
national average in the mid-1990s, reviving to 96 percent after the dot-com boom 
centered in Silicon Valley, and sliding down to 91 percent since then. 
  The simple non-econometric evidence suggests that the California political 
outcome in school finance is peculiarly inefficient, and not simply by denying funds.  
While the famous Serrano decisions and Proposition 13 clearly cut expenditures since the 
1970s, the story is not simply one of a polity trapped by anti-tax radicals. Rather, 
California has caught between this force and at least two others since about the 1970s:  
high immigration and a powerful teachers’ lobby.  The result combines moderate 
expenditures with high teacher pay, crowded classrooms, and low test scores.   
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND AGENDA 
 
  It should now be evident why this paper focuses on revealing failures rather than 
on revealing successes in education output, and why its title highlights finance rather than 
learning.  The failures appear to spring more from the public finance side, making it 
easier for economists and economic historians to suggest solutions.  By contrast, the 
success cases probably relate less to economists’ comparative research advantage, being 
due in greater part to differences in pedagogical technique and social environment. 
  There are sufficient non-econometric tools to exploit and interpret the abundant 
historical information about the progress of schooling in the data-constrained past.  Even 
without the randomized natural experiments that we prefer, we can identify prime 
suspects for several cases of failure in education supply.   
  We can even see some patterns in the preliminary signs.  Looking at earlier 
centuries, it should easier to find cases where education was under-supported rather than 
over-supported, given the high rates of return not captured.  Most visible failures seem to 
be cases of inegalitarian policy, under-investing in mass primary schooling.  So past    Page  37 
 
scholars have feared, and so say the new indicators especially for Victorian Britain, and 
possibly for Belgium in the late nineteenth century.  We have also raised the possibility 
that secure Western European states could have accelerated mass education, and 
economic growth, as much as two centuries earlier than they did.  The balance of guilt 
may be shifting.  Our clues from the start of the twenty-first century point less at tax-
blocking elites, and more at the messiness of political compromises between them and 
their opponents.   
  These modest early clues point toward at least four areas for further detective 
work in the history of education finance: 
  (1) One set of projects relates to the reasons for the delay in Western Europe’s 
public primary schooling.  In which cases did those in power pass up productive 
opportunities because their narrow self-interest opposed educating the masses?  In which 
cases were they not sufficiently secure in their power to believe that the later tax revenues 
from a more educated population would be theirs to control? For example, could the 
Dutch Republic have launched free schools in the first half of the 17th century, leading 
their actual history by two and a half centuries?  Might the government budget have been 
able to spend more on wars with England with the help of the extra taxes raised?  
Certainly they could have borrowed the extra money, if they chose, at interest rates that 
were even lower than Britain’s consol rate before 1792 and only about one percent above 
the consol rate for most of the nineteenth century. For France, too, it is possible to argue 
that political opposition delayed schooling by more than a century.
59   
  (2) Another project would pursue whether or not the early failure in public 
primary education was matched by public health failure.  Why were the public 
improvements in urban sanitation, for example, delayed until the nineteenth century?  
One possibility is that sanitation, unlike basic education, waited on breakthroughs in 
knowledge, such as the discovery of the link between water supplies and cholera.  If so, 
policy may have been blameless in this area of public health.  An opposing possibility is 
suggested by Jeffrey Williamson, who notes that some partial advances in English and 
French urban sanitation dated back to the late seventeenth century and the early 
eighteenth, suggesting a policy failure of the sort described for primary education in this    Page  38 
 
paper.
60  Here is a related policy issue for which a broad early history can use non-
econometric techniques.   
  (3) Another research priority is to pursue an issue that is a close relative of this 
paper’s inquiry into mass primary and secondary education: How would one judge the 
insufficiency or excess of public support for higher education, beyond the few clues 
suggested by some literature cited here?  And does a closer look really substantiate this 
paper’s suspicions against excess spending on tertiary education at the expense of 
primary and secondary?   
  (4) Finally, why was the balance of apparent guilt different in the past from 
today’s patterns in the OECD and within the United States?  In earlier history, and in 
developing countries today, the most frequent culprit appears to have been elites’ 
blocking of tax support for schools.  So we saw in the case of British education in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and also in the global tendency for social rates of 
return on still-unachieved schooling to be highest at in poorer countries.  In today’s 
OECD countries, however, the cases of clear under-funding of mass education are being 
crowded out by cases of apparent inefficiency in some polities’ delivery of education 
from historically high budgets.  Explaining this long drift from inegalitarian tax-blocking 
to inefficient political compromise remains high on the research agenda in the history of 
education.   




Notes to Table 1: 
The parameters Wc, C, ΔW, U, and ø are measured relative to the annual income of  
an individual earnings the lower-education wage rate.  In the 19th and earlier centuries, 
this is an unskilled wage rate in the building trades.   
 
The effects are predicted static general-equilibrium results, including next-generation 
effects on the educational attainment of the adult labor force. 
 
Blank = no clear direction of effect is implied.   
*The distinction between measured average gains in earnings and true marginal gains is 
especially important in the case of discrimination.  Whether the discrimination is in the 
Table 1.   Fingerprints: How Various Forces (Suspects) Would Affect
Indicators Indirectly Linked to Primary Schooling
Each cell summarizes a predicted effect of a force that has lowered primary schooling 
in our featured setting B relative to a higher-education setting A.
Three kinds of fingerprints (ΔF's) --
(1) Market rates (2) Measured* rates of return
Wc C ΔW on extra primary education:
Measured*
Direct adult wage Private Social Fiscal
 -- left by these forces reducing Child cost of gains from rate rate rate
demand for primary schooling in B: wage school education rP rS rF
less market demand for skilled labor UP down down down down
more demand for child labor UP UP UP UP
higher fertility down UP UP UP UP
lower adult life expectancy UP down (a) down (a) down
family distaste for schooling UP UP UP UP
discrimination in skilled-labor markets UP UP UP UP
 -- and of these forces restricting its supply in B:
discrimination in school admissions UP UP UP UP
higher unit costs of schooling UP UP down (b) down UP
less philanthropy for primary schooling UP down (b) UP UP
less political support
for tax-based schooling UP down (b) UP UP
(3) Support ratios for primary schooling
Two additional fingerprints are:
(3a) Tax support ratio (3b) Primary/tertiary
for primary pupils double ratio
less political support for tax-based
mass primary schooling down down
(No other force has a clear predicted
effect on the support ratios.)   Page  40 
 
labor market or in admissions to educational institutions, it will lower the true marginal 
rate of return for those discriminated against, though it will raise the average measured 
return for insiders. 
(a) = Reducing life expectancy would initially lower the private and social return to 
primary education, though the reduction in educational attainment would later offset part 
of this effect by raising ΔW. 
(b) = These initially lower the private return to primary education by raising its cost, 
though the reduction in educational attainment would later offset part of this effect by 
raising ΔW. 
 
Fuller definitions of the support ratio indicators (fingerprints):   
(3a) Absolute tax support for primary pupils  = (tax-based expenditures per primary 
school pupil) / (GDP per adult).    
(3b) Relative tax support for primary pupils = the same double ratio, but divided by the 
corresponding double ratio for university education. 
 
Imagined exogenous sources of each force, and further explanation of the effects: 
More demand for child labor:  May be due to shifts toward child-using sectors, such as 
agriculture.  Would lower school attendance, of course, later raising the supply of 
unskilled adult labor at the expense of skilled labor.  So the wage gain ΔW would be 
raised later. 
 
High unit costs of schooling:  May be due to restrictions training fewer teachers, or 
denying teacher careers to women, or less efficiency in education techniques. By 
lowering the supply of more educated entrants into the labor force, such cost-push factors 
will raise the wage gains for those who have the extra schooling. 
 
Less market demand for skilled labor: Could be due to de-skilling shifts in technology. 
Symmetrically, it can be due to any force that shifts demand toward more skills in Setting 
A, leaving B behind.  
 
Family distaste for schooling can arise from any cultural source: The most prominent 
historical variant is aversion to educating females.   
 
Discrimination in skilled-labor markets:  Discrimination by gender, class, caste, tribe, or 
guild connections in occupations other than teaching. The measured private rates of 
return will reflect the larger wage gains of the favored insiders. 
 
Discrimination in school admissions: Again, discrimination by class, caste, tribe, gender, 
or guild connections:  The effects depend on how negative are the effects on overall 
attendance. The table shows the effects of simply denying admissions to the outsider 
groups, without raising the admissions and attendance of favored insiders.  
 
Less political support for tax-based schooling, on the part of those with political 
influence: This can result from restricted suffrage, or an elite-based autocracy.      Page  41 
 
Table 2.   Average Rates of Return to Investment in Education by Level, 
1970s-1990s, by per Capita Income Group
(internal rates of return, in percent per annum)
Private (overestimated) Social
Primary Secondary Higher Primary Secondary Higher
Per capita income group of countries
High Income 25.6 12.2 12.4 13.4 10.3 9.5
Middle Income 27.4 18.0 19.3 18.8 12.9 11.3
Low Income 25.8 19.9 26.0 21.3 15.7 11.2
World 26.6 17.0 19.0 18.9 13.1 10.8
Individual countries
Canada 1994 7.8 13.0
Japan 1976 13.4 10.4 8.8 9.6 8.6 6.9
USA 1987 10.0 12.0
Latin America and the Caribbean
Argentina 1989 10.1 14.2 14.9 8.4 7.1 7.6
Brazil 1989 36.6 5.1 28.2 35.6 5.1 21.4
Chile 1989 9.7 12.9 20.7 8.1 11.1 14.0
Costa Rica 1989 12.2 17.6 12.9 11.2 14.4 9.0
Dom. Rep. 1989 85.1 15.1 19.4
El Salvador 1990 16.4 13.3 8.0 18.9 14.5 9.5
Guatemala 1989 33.8 17.9 22.2
Jamaica 1989 20.4 15.7 17.7 7.9
Mexico 1992 11.8 14.6 11.1 18.9 20.1 15.7
Asia
China 1993 18.0 13.4 15.1 14.4 12.9 11.3
Hong Kong 1976 18.5 25.2 15.0 12.4
India 1995 2.6 17.6 18.2
Korea, South 1986 10.1 17.9 8.8 15.5
Malaysia 1978 32.6 34.5
Pakistan 1991 8.4 13.7 31.2
Philippines 1988 18.3 10.5 11.6 13.3 8.9 10.5
Singapore 1999 22.2 12.9 18.7 16.7 10.1 13.9
Sri Lanka 1981 12.6 16.1
Thailand 1989 16.0 12.9 11.8
Sources and notes to Table 2:
Source: For rates of return, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004a, Table A1).
High income group = GDP per capita at or above $9,266 in 1990 PPP dollars, with group
    mean = $22,530.  Low Income group = GDP per capita at or below $755, with mean $363.
The middle income group had a mean income of $2,966, and the world mean was $7,669.
The private rates are overestimated because they assume zero taxation of the extra
    earnings gained from education.  See the text.   Page  42 
 
Sources and notes to Table 3:  
Sources: OECD Education at a Glance, 1992, p. 63 (primary school only); idem, 2005, pp. 172-
3; IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years; and UN (2001) for age distributions. 
The “1985” figure for the OECD core uses data from 1988.   
The “1995” figures for the OECD and for developing countries use data from 1999.   
The figures for Canada and the United States aggregate secondary education with primary.   
Argentina's figures use data from 1984-1985 and 1994-1996 as "1985" and "1986".   
See also the notes to Table 4.  
Table 3.  Primary-School Support Ratios in Core OECD
Countries, Latin America, and Asia 1960-2002
The support ratio = (public "current" primary-school public expenditures
per pupil) divided by (GDP per person 15 or older)
Region or
country 1960-65 1970-75 1985 1995 2002
Core OECD 22.0 23.7 22.8
Canada 21.6 30.4 25.6 28.7
Japan 20.6 20.8
USA 20.5 25.0 25.2 27.5 28.5
Developing countries 21.3
Latin America and the Caribbean
Argentina 7.5 11.4 13.3
Brazil 15.1 14.4 15.7 13.2
Chile 13.0 10.9 16.6 15.2
Costa Rica 25.9 13.2 15.6
Cuba 22.1 33.4
Dom. Rep. 6.4 5.1
El Salvador 5.7 4.8
Guatemala 7.8 7.6
Jamaica 11.1 9.8 13.8 16.0 12.3
Mexico 11.4 10.3 18.8 16.9
Venezuela 15.1 8.8
Asia
China 6.6 8.9 11.9
Hong Kong 8.9 10.5 13.3
India 9.8 10.6 16.6 16.6 15.7
Korea, South 11.0 10.0 19.6 19.8 19.1
Malaysia 21.4 12.8
Pakistan 16.2 18.1 15.3
Philippines 15.9 8.7 15.6 18.6
Singapore 10.7 13.2 10.2
Sri Lanka 24.7 25.4 12.4 11.0
Thailand 16.3 11.8   Page  43 
 
Table 4.  Which Postwar Governments Have Short-changed 
Primary Education Relative to Higher Education?
Each cell number is a ratio of (public support of primary education per pupil), 
as a % of (public support of higher schooling per pupil)
This percentage should be at least 50 (see text)
Region or
country 1960-65 1970-75 1985 1995 2002
Core OECD 51.0 43.2 56.1
Canada 25.2 29.8 67.2 63.4
Japan 90.9 200.0 90.9 108.4 126.6
USA 51.2 81.3 71.3 73.4 77.5
Developing countries 14.7
Latin America & Caribbean,
18 countries 6.7 10.6 13.7 17.9
Argentina 22.2 12.1 31.5 40.1 52.4
Brazil 2.1 8.2 7.2 8.1
Chile 3.9 8.6 9.6 45.5
Colombia 2.9 17.5 21.7
Costa Rica 10.9 17.2 12.9 23.1
Cuba (1950/55) 71.4 43.5 50.0
Jamaica 6.5 9.1 4.0 5.5
Mexico 9.2 9.8 8.5 23.3 29.4
Venezuela 6.5 11.8 11.6 6.8
Asian developing countries
China ('75) 0.9 3.2 9.4 7.1
Hong Kong 70.4 84.9
India 4.2 4.8 11.9 11.0 13.2
Indonesia 9.8 15.0 12.8
Korea, South 45.5 58.8 113.5 263.9 339.8
Malaysia 3.8 5.8 9.5 10.6 17.6
Pakistan 5.8 7.5
Philippines 130.2 45.7 62.2 29.3
Singapore 13.7 14.7 13.7 23.7
Sri Lanka 10.4 7.4 14.1 12.1
Thailand 6.8 8.3 49.9 33.7 32.3
African countries
Kenya 0.6 0.8 2.3 1.8
Malawi 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.6
Tanzania 0.6 0.9 0.7   Page  44 
 
Sources and notes to Table 4:    
  Sources:  UNESCO, World Education Report, 1991-2000; OECD Education at a 
Glance, (1992, p. 63); Ioschpe (2004, p. 184); and Claudia Goldin’s compilations in 
Carter et al., Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition, vol. 2. 
  I am indebted to Ewout Frankema for some calculations for 1960/5 through 
1990/5, from his paper-in-progress on “Mass Education in Twentieth-Century Latin 
America: A Quantity-Quality Trade off?”, which used UNESCO data. The 1960s and 
1970s data for about half the countries are my own calculations from the UNESCO 
Statistical Yearbook and IMF, International Financial Statistics. For China and Thailand 
2002, Asaoka (2006, p. 42), citing UNESCO Institute of Statistics.  For Chile, the 
1970/75 figure refers to the post-coup year 1975 only.     
  Most of the expenditure figures refer to current expenditures, the main exceptions 
being figures for 2002 and figures for the United States.  They omit tax breaks and some 
household subsidies for education, and they omit capital costs. For 1965-1995 figures, 
current expenditures unallocated by level of expenditure were spread proportionately 
across the levels. 
  Notes on years covered:  The years covered in “1960-65” and “1970-75” vary 
from country to country. The year “1995” is really 1999 in the case of core OECD, 
Brazil, and developing countries.  Korea's figure is so low because of a high private share 
of tertiary expenditure.     
  For the United States, the expenditure-per-student numerator ratio combines 
primary and secondary public schools.  
  The 1985 figure refers to a 1980-1985 average in the cases of Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, and the Africa countries.  For Cuba, the 1995 figure is also an 
average for 1990-1995.       
  For 2002 the OECD’s numbers are based on full-time school year equivalents.  
Lacking data on private expenditures, the 2002 data for Brazil, Malaysia, and Philippines 
are for total expenditures, which were predominantly but not completely public. For all 
other countries in 2002, expenditures for primary schooling had to be allocated between 
private and public according to the ratios given for the larger aggregate of primary, 
secondary, and non-tertiary post-secondary education.      
  The figures for expenditures on tertiary institutions generally include expenditures 
on research and development, along with expenditures on instruction.  For 2002, the 
instructional shares of the total tertiary budgets were 79% for core OECD countries, and 




Sources and Notes to Table 5:  
  The two main sources are the studies by David Mitch (1982, 1983, 1984, 1992) and Jason 
Long (2006).  Supporting data on taxes paid by working-class families in the 1830s were taken 
from Hilditch citing the Poor Law Commission, and for circa 1868 from Baxter (1869, pp. 110-
112). The consol interest rates are from Homer and Sylla (1991, pp. 195-196).   
  Assumptions behind the hypothetical calculations, based on parameters in these sources: 
  Life cycles: All were males who married at the age of 26. Those who married in 1840 
were born in 1814, and started their schooling in 1821. They enjoyed enhanced wage rates from 
1832 to 1862, except that those in (b.) continued working to 1871.  The hypothetical grooms of 
1868 were born in 1835, started school in 1842, and enjoyed enhanced earnings from 1853 to 
1883.  Those attending school in the 1851 census were born in 1842, started their six years of 
primary schooling in 1848, and enjoyed enhanced earnings from 1860 to 1890.   
  Weekly child wages during 25 weeks of school each year = 2 shillings for (a.), (c.), (f.), 
(g.), and (h.); for (b.), 31.25s a week for two years, then twice that for the third year; and three 
shillings a week for (d.) and (e.). 
  Total direct cost of schooling = 6d a week for (a.), (c.), (f.), and (h.); 14 s a year for (b.); 
£1.27 a year for (d.) and (e.); and £1.35 a year for (g.).  The part of this cost that was subsidized by 
government was zero for the 1840 estimates, £0.525 for (f.), and £0.48 for (d.) and (e.).     
  The adult wage increments for 50 weeks a year, from literacy or primary schooling: (a.), 
(f.), and the males in (h.) = 2.47 s a week; (b.) = 2.7 s a week for ages 18-26, then 4.54 s a week for 
ages 27-57; (c.) = 4.66 s; (d.) = 1.86 s; (e.) = 4.18 s; and (g.) = £7.74 a year.       
  (h.) is the "half-ben" case in which the child is a male-female mix with a 50% earnings rate. 
  Tax rate paid by working class parents and sons = 5 percent of expenditures for 1840 and 
8.96 percent for estimates (d.), (e.), and (g.). 
Table 5.  Estimated Rates of Return on Literacy and Primary Schooling in Victorian England
Internal rates of return
(1) Three year's schooling, achieving signature literacy Yield on British
Approximate Public government
year of  Private Social Fiscal (gov't + consol securities
marriage Population group family (all parties) (government) donors) at start of schooling
(a.) 1840 Grooms who were sons of laborers 15.3 14.8 16.5 12.9 4.4 in 1821
(b.) 1840 Grooms who were sons of laborers 19.5 19.0 21.2 13.6 4.4     "
(c.) 1840 Grooms from all classes 20.1 19.6 21.5 17.4 4.4     "
(d.) 1868 Grooms who were sons of laborers 11.0 9.9 6.5 6.3 3.4 in 1842.
(e.) 1868 Grooms from all classes 16.5 15.2 11.2 11.0 3.4     "
(2) State elementary, 3 tax-funded years to learn signature literacy
(f.) 1840 Grooms who were sons of laborers 16.4 14.8 5.4 5.4 4.4 in 1821
(3) Six years of elementary school
(g.) age 18 School attenders of 1851 (Long 2006) 14.0 12.1 7.4 5.8 3.1 in 1851.
in 1860
(h.) 1840 Labourers' children, 50% in labor force 10.7 10.3 11.8 8.6 4.4 in 1821   Page  46 
 
 
Sources and notes to Table 6:    
The main source for Venezuela is Carl Shoup et al. (1959), and for Mexico the works of 
Martin Carnoy (1964, 1967a, 1967b). 
  These are supplemented with life-table survival rates based on data from 1959-
1961 for Mexico and 1963 for Venezuela.  Carnoy conducted his own survey of a few 
thousand urban Mexican workers and their family members in 1963, and based his 
published rates of return on these micro-data.  By contrast, Shoup and collaborators based 
their estimates of present values and rates of return for Venezuela on aggregate average 
relationships of earnings to occupation, age, and schooling.   
  Both sets of data have been reworked here, however, to refine the fiscal side of 
education.  My retention of most of Carnoy's assumptions yields rates of returns in the 
same range as his.  For Venezuela, however, my rates of return are below the very high 
estimates announced by Shoup and his collaborators.  The main reasons for the 
discrepancy are that (a) Shoup and collaborators omitted any opportunity costs of the 
student's time, and (b) they omitted indirect taxation (usually 10-11 percent of income) 
from their calculations of private and social returns, and omitted any fiscal rates of return. 
For further details on my re-working of the estimates, download Excel files for Mexico 
and Venezuela from http://econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzlinder, clicking on "Data and 
estimates underlying “Revealing Failures in the History of Education Finance.” 
Table 6.   Estimated Rates of Return to Investment in Education,
Venezuela 1958 and Mexico 1963
Percentage of direct Internal rates of return (%)
costs paid for Private  Social Fiscal
by government (family & donors) (all parties) (gov't)
A. Assuming males rates of adult earnings
Venezuela 1958 primary school 53.5 24.0% 21.4% 12.9%
" secondary 100 17.5% 15.3% 8.8%
" university 100 25.4% 20.1% 10.2%
Mexico 1963 primary school 58.1 15.1% 14.0% 7.8%
secondary 81.2 14.9% 13.2% 5.9%
university 88.5 17.0% 13.9% 3.9%
B.  Assuming half these rates of adult earnings (e.g. if women had no career earnings)
Venezuela 1958 primary school 53.5 14.8% 13.2% 7.6%
" secondary 100 10.5% 9.1% 4.8%
" university 100 15.3% 12.0% 5.7%
Mexico 1963 primary school 58.1 10.8% 9.9% 4.9%
secondary 81.2 10.1% 8.8% 2.9%
university 88.5 10.3% 7.9% -0.0%   Page  47 
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SOURCES AND NOTES TO FIGURES 1-10 
 
All of the numbers used in the figures will be posted at http://econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzlinder. 
 
Figures 1-3:  
  The estimates of GDP per capita in 1870, 1900, and 1930 in 1990 international 
PPP dollars are those of Angus Maddison (1995 and 2001).  The enrollments data are 
derived from other sources in Lindert (2004, Volume 2, Appendix A), from the Banks 
post-1815 data base, and from Benavot and Riddle (1988), in that order of priority. In 
some cases where it was impossible to obtain the 5-14 population denominator from the 
Lindert sources or from Banks, I used the school age population denominator from 
Benavot and Riddle, introducing some differences in the ratio definition. 
  The reason that the UK dot fails to look like a weighted average within the 
triangle formed by England-Wales, Ireland, and Scotland seems to be that the GDP per 
capita and the enrollment rates are based on different weighting schemes (total population 
versus population 5-14). 
 
Figure 4: 
  The estimates of GDP per capita in 1970 in 1990 international PPP dollars are 
taken from the Penn World Tables, version 6.2, measure rgdpch.  The same source is 
used for GDP per capita in Figures 5-7. 
  As a proxy for enrollments sometime around that 1970 date, I used the 
educational attainment of the 15-64 age group, as measured thirty years later, in 2000.  
These year-2000 data are drawn from http://soto.iae-csic.org/Data.htm , accessed 18 June 
2009.  This source is cited, and the estimates explained, in Cohen and Soto (2007).  
 
Figure 5:  
  The average reading, mathematics, and science achievement scores of 15-year-
olds are from the PISA 2006 exams (OECD, PISA 2007).   
 
Figure 6: 
  The Reading and Math scores are combinations of different LLECE 1997 scores 
and SERCE 2006 scores, from Hanushek and Woessmann (2009b, Appendix Table A1). 
 
Figure 7:  
  From National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) for 2005, I averaged 
scores for reading and math for 8th graders, after converting each into separate standard 
deviation units in the distribution of averages across states.  The source is 
http://nces.ed.gov/quicktables, Table 129, accessed June 2009. 
 
Figures 8 and 9: 
  The enrollment rates are from the same sources listed above for Figures 1-3.  The 
current expenditures per pupil, expressed in US dollars, are taken from US Commissioner 
of Education, Annual Report 1899-1900, pp. 2618-2621: "Elementary Education in 
Foreign Countries”: and US Commissioner of Education, Annual Report 1900-1901, pp. 
2483-5: "Statistics of Elementary Education in Foreign Countries."  These can include    Page  56 
 
private expenditures in some cases, though differences in public expenditures probably 
dominate the expenditure differences shown here.   
 
Figure 10:  
  The PISA scores for 2006 are from the same source as listed for Figure 7.  The 
public expenditures per primary pupil in the school year 2004-2005 are from OECD 
Education at a Glance 2007. 
 
Figure 11:  
  The test scores are the same as those used in Table 7.  Current expenditures per 
pupil in public primary and secondary schools for the academic year 2004-2005 are from 
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1 Easterlin (1981). For updates on the global advance of school enrollments, see Benavot and Riddle (1988) 
and Clemens (2004).  
2 A classic non-econometric single-country study is North and Weingast (1989), with revisions by Clark 
(1996).  The econometric testing of institutional influences from earlier centuries has been led by De Long 
and Shleifer (1993); Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002); and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). 
3 Clark (2007). 
4 Bils and Klenow 2000.  Similarly, the refreshingly iconoclastic work by Lant Pritchett on international 
macro-estimates of the effects of education does not deny its positive role (Pritchett 2001, 2008). 
5 On the civic participation effects of schooling, see Dee (2004) and Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos 
2004.  On its crime prevention effect, see Lochner and Moretti (2004). Currie and Moretti (2003) and other 
studies find positive effects of schooling on health. Other studies use production-function econometrics to 
capture the productivity effects of spillovers that leave no specific imprint (Moretti 2004a, 2004b, and a 
survey in 2006). See also the surveys by Krueger and Lindahl (2001) and McMahon (2004).  
  The natural-experiment study by Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) emphasized the low statistical 
significance of externalities from the extra schooling triggered by compulsory schooling laws.  Yet they 
authors acknowledge that their point estimates still include enough externalities to justify noticeable 
subsidies, and that their experiment was limited to externalities from secondary education alone.   
6 See, for example Angrist and Krueger (1991), Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), and Lleras-Muney (2005). 
7 Mariscal and Sokoloff (2000), Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloff (forthcoming).  The present author’s 
transatlantic empirics are also comparative and reach conclusions like those of the Engerman-Mariscal-
Sokoloff team, but tend to rely more on panel-data econometrics, with the usual caveats about exogeneity 
and instrument power (Lindert 2004, Chs. 5 and 15). 
8 If there are exceptions in which society over-invested public funds in primary education rather than higher 
education, they would probably be highly egalitarian communist regimes, such as Cuba under Castro.  Yet I 
am not aware of any study that has quantified such overinvestment in basic education. 
9 Lack of numeracy is demonstrated in the aggregate by age heaping, the tendency to round numbers off to 
integers ending in 0 or 5.  See Baten and Crayen (2008) and A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen (2009). 
10 The underlying structure shaping education outcomes might conceivably involve different a’s and b’s in 
the two polities.  If so, any judgment of the education performance of B should use a counterfactual 
drawing on the coefficients from B, posing questions of the form “If B had had A’s values of the 
independent variables Edt-1, Z and X, how would its education outcome have differed, in our view, given 
B’s own structure?” 
11 The poverty defense argues that exogenous income determinants (in the Z vector) have lowered 
education simply because the income elasticity of education is positive.  The Wagner’s Law defense 
excuses the poorer and lower-education country even from spending as great a share of its income on    Page  64 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
public services (in this case, public education).  Applying either of these defenses requires that the less 
educated country be the poorer one, which is ruled out in the cases defined as education anomalies here. 
12 Sandberg (1979), Lindert (2004, v. 2, Appendix A). 
13 The larger tables behind Figure 1-5, complete with the countries whose dots are unlabeled, will be posted 
at http://econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzlinder.  The sources for enrollments 1870-1930 are those reported in 
Lindert (2004, v. 2, Appendix A).  The educational attainments of adults in 2000 are from http://soto.iae-
csic.org/Data.htm (accessed 18 June 2009), as described in Cohen and Soto (2007). The PISA test scores 
for 2006 (with some splicing from PISA 2003 scores, as in the case of the US reading scores) are from the 
online version of OECD Education at a Glance 2007. The GDP per capita estimates for 1870-1930 are 
from Maddison (2001), and those for 1970 and 2004 are from Penn World Table 6.2.   
14 In addition to the sources cited in the preceding footnote, see the UN’s Arab Human Development Report 
(2005). 
15 According to Penn World Table 6.2, Niger’s income per capita has now sunk sufficiently since about 
1990 for Mawali to catch up.   
16 Hoxby (1998), Grissmer et al. (2000), and other sources cited in Lindert (2004, Ch. 6). 
17 Tuttle (1998, 1999). 
18 Lindert (1978, Chs. 6, 7). 
19 Even a relatively unhealthy country today, like Burkina Faso, is arguably on the same enrollment 
trajectory, and the same life expectancy, as were England and America at nineteenth-century dates with 
comparable PPP incomes per capita.  For the enrollment comparison, see Clemens (2004, especially Tables 
10, 11).  Life expectancy from birth in Burkino Faso was about 44 years at the end of the twentieth century, 
versus 40 in England in 1851 or 38 in the United States in 1850 (Wrigley and Schofield 1981, Table A.3; 
Carter et al. (2006, volume 1, pp. 447-448).  The adult life expectancies were probably also similar.   
20 Mitch (1982, 1984, and 1992) and Solmon (1970, 1975). 
21 For United States, one could start with the data series in Claudia Goldin’s education chapter in volume 2 
of Carter et al. (2006), and consult Solmon (1970, 1975) for detailed cost estimates by state in 1880 and 
1890.   
22 In addition to the correlations shown in Figures 5 and 6, see Tan and Mingat (1992), OECD (various 
years), and UNESCO (various years).  IQ scores have also been correlated with economic development, 
both internationally in recent years and across the 20th century in each of several OECD countries (Flynn 
1984, 1987, 2000).  It remains to be seen how much the improvement in IQ scores relates to schooling and 
how much to such other factors as health or learning the test. 
23 For a global cross-section from 1988-1992 data, see Freeman and Oostendorp (2000, especially Table 3).  
On Latin America, see Frankema (2009, ch. 4), De Ferranti et al. (2004, p. 316). 
24 Williamson and Lindert (1980), Margo’s wage chapter in Carter et al. (2006), Williamson (2006), Goldin 
and Katz (2008, esp. Chapter 8).    Page  65 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 Clark (2007, Chapter 8).  Looking at several sectors rather than just the building trades, Phelps Brown 
(1977) and Williamson (1982) find no clear movements in skill premia since the eighteenth century. 
26 Van Zanden (2009a, 2009b). 
27 Van Leeuwen (2007). 
28 For explicit treatment of non-economic returns from education, see Becker (1963), Mitch (1982, 1992), 
Haveman and Wolfe (1984), and Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2009). 
29 This paper uses only the “full method” cross-sectional estimates based on monetary benefits and costs, 
avoiding any rates of return in the tradition of Jacob Mincer.  The Mincerian estimates never explore the 
costs of education, or who paid for them, and instead use extra years of schooling as a cost proxy.  Such an 
approach is a non-starter here, given this paper’s desire to focus more attention on who paid whom for the 
schooling.  In addition, the Mincerian estimates have come in for serious econometric criticisms regarding 
their functional form (e.g. Heckman, Lochner, and Todd 2008), and often yield unstable estimates.   
30 As Lant Pritchett has pointed out (2001, 373, note 6), the higher rate of return on primary education 
derives not so much from a higher percent pay increase in later life as from the simple fact that the 
opportunity cost of the child’s time is so much lower in the earlier years of the education cycle.   
31 Psacharopoulos (1981, p. 323).  Emphasis in the original.   
32 Hansen (1963, esp. p. 136), Becker (1964, esp. p. 167).  
33 OECD (2005, pp. 125-126). 
34 In an open economy, one would have to lower the tax rate to reflect partial losses due to an average rate 
of brain drain.  This paper deals mainly with large-country cases, where this effect would be negligible.  
One might also worry that the calculations need to include any crowding out or crowding in of private 
education from the extension of government subsidies.  Yet the calculations applied in this paper assume 
that the government subsidizes all schools, as in a voucher plan, so that substitution between public and 
private schools has less relevance.  One must also not overlook something obvious to the historian: In most 
settings where public subsidies were not provided, private schooling was also lacking for most children.  
This would have limited the amount of crowding out. 
35 One can choose variants on this basic measure, depending on practicalities and purpose.  They fall into 
three main categories: (1) tax effort, (2) absolute public inputs per child, and (3) relative public inputs per 
child (the “support ratio” featured here).  Each has its strengths and weaknesses. 
  (1) Tax effort is conveniently measured by the share of national income devoted to subsidizing 
primary education.  This straightforward ratio unfortunately can be raised or lowered just by diffrences in 
the share of population that is school-aged, making a country look less generous when in fact it simply has 
fewer children (e.g. nineteenth-century France).   
  (2) The absolute public inputs of subsidies per child are closer to the input concept preferred by 
the production-function literature in the economics of education.  These inputs can be measured per 
enrolled pupil, per attending pupil, or per child of school age.  The last denominator has the advantage and 
disadvantage of including the enrollment or attendance rate in the measure. That is good or bad depending    Page  66 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
on whether enrollment and attendance were driven by the supply of student slots (our present purpose) or 
the parental demand for slots.  
  (3) The relative public inputs per child is captured by the “support ratio” of (subsidies/child) to 
(GDP per capita or per adult of working age).  It best dramatizes the departures from the usual positive 
Wagner’s Law relationship of tax effort to income per capita.  Here again its “child” measure can refer to 
enrolled students, attending students, or children of school age.  The choice again depends on which of 
these comes closest to tracking the supply of subsidies as opposed to parental demand.  My choices in the 
text reflect my hunches about how best to proxy the public supply-of-subsidies side.  
36 In cases of discriminatory access to subsidized schools, one must avoid the pitfall of mis-applying the 
subsidies per favored-group student to the larger population or its incomes.  For example, one must take 
care not to use the wrong data from the American post-bellum South or from South Africa under apartheid.  
Separate support ratios must be applied to different groups, and compared with the incomes of the relevant 
taxpayers. 
37 Hanushek and Woessmann (2008, 2009, and forthcoming). 
38 For the debate over whether externalities are truly greater in higher education, and how this might hinge 
on the degree of separability of research from instruction, see Birsdall (1987, 1996) versus Psacharopoulos 
(1996).  See also Behrman (1996) on the methodological difficulties involved.   
39 Castelló and Doménech (2002). 
40 The comparison with current leading-country practice can be doubted and replaced with an opposing 
infant-industry or Gerschenkronian argument in favor of tilting toward investments in higher education in 
developing countries.  Given that higher education calls for very high fixed costs before its research and 
instruction can compete with the leading foreign universities, it might be more necessary for higher 
education than for primary education to have the government force its growth with heavy subsidies.  The 
present paper can only pose this possibility, and not yet resolved it. 
  A key clue to the validity of the infant-industry or Gerschenkronian argument would be whether or 
not countries that caught up in the past and became educational leaders did it by tipping government 
subsidies away from primary education and toward higher education, like some of today’s developing 
countries covered in Table 4.  A good case study would be North America and Australasia, which had to 
catch up with Britain, France, and Germany in the nineteenth century.  While I am still gathering data on 
American university finance between the Civil War and World War II, it seems that the Northeastern states 
achieved their global prominence in higher education with primary/tertiary ratios above the text 50% 
threshold, to judge from the data for 1850 and from 1950 on.  The Southern and Western states usually had 
lower primary/tertiary ratios, but also failed to catch up to the Northeast. 
41 O’Brien (1988), Brewer (1989), North and Weingast (1989), Schultz and Weingast (1998).   
42 Specifically, the United Kingdom’s public support ratio for primary schools was the lowest of five data-
supplying countries in 1870 and the lowest of seven data-supplying countries in 1900.  In terms of primary-   Page  67 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
school teachers per 100 pupils, the UK ranked fifth out of seven data-supplying countries in 1870, and 8th 
out of 16 data-supplying countries in 1900. See Lindert (2004, Volume 2, Appendices A and C). 
43 Lindert (2003; 2004, Chapters 5 and 15).  See in particular Figure 5.3 (p. 97), which reveals a tax-support 
anomaly about England that corresponds to the education output anomaly of Figures 1-3 in this paper.   
44 The estimates based on David Mitch’s data fall within the range of possible private and social rates of 
return he staked out  (Mitch 1982, 1984, 1992).  Professor Mitch suggests that my estimate based on Jason 
Long’s work may have been too pessimistic in assuming that it would take six years of primary school to 
achieve the kind of wage gains estimated by Long.  I am grateful to him for his advice on these estimates.   
45 Massie (1761). 
46 Homer and Sylla (1991, Chs. 8-9); Clark (1996), Dincecco (2009a, 2009b).   
47 Go and Lindert (2010, Table 2). For further prewar data on females’ shares of  primary teach, and their 
relative salaries, see the two “female teachers” files in http://econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzlinder . 
48 Mariscal and Sokoloff 2000; Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloff, forthcoming.  The quotation comes from 
the latter. 
49 Frankema 2009, Chapter 4. 
50 Nugent and Robinson (forthcoming) are also urging the shift of more attention to the development policy 
failures of Venezuela since it fell under dictatorships in the early twentieth century.   
51 The relative position of Latin America for given income per capita is less dramatic in Figures 2 and 3 
than in Frankema’s 4.1 because of a difference in samples.  Figures 2 and 3 include more countries from 
outside of the OECD core, some of which had enrollment deficiencies similar to those of Latin America.   
52 Ibid. [Frankema 2009, Chapter 4]. 
53 To add the lag behind Guyana to the contrasts in Figures 2-6, see the Unesco Institute of Statistics 
homepage: http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/ReportFolders /ReportFolders.aspx.  See in particular the 
secondary school enrollment rates documented between 1970 and 2000.   
54 For differences in national wage structures 1988-1992, see Freeman and Oostendorp (2000, especially 
Tables 3, 4). 
55 Frankema (2009, Table 4.2). 
56 On Brazil, Mexico, and Chile, see Ioschpe (2004), and Lindert, Skoufias, and Shapiro (2006).  On Asia, 
see Tan and Mingat (1992). 
57 Shoup et al. (1959), p. 409. 
58 Lewis Solmon (1975) gives data on direct resources costs per public elementary school pupil in 1880.  
California ranked second to Colorado in such costs per pupil. This was likely a wage effect at least as much 
as a small-class-size effect.  For teacher pay by state in the most recent years, see 
www.nces.ed.gov/quicktables. 
59 Dincecco (2009a, especially Figures 1-2).   
60 Williamson (1990, Ch. 10, especially pp. 281-297). 